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INTRODUCTION 
Every spring, anticipation builds in advance of the annual Costume 
Institute Exhibition and Gala Benefit at the New York Metropolitan 
Museum of Art (“Met”).  Last spring was no different.  In May 2012, the 
Met launched Schiaparelli and Prada: Impossible Conversations, a series 
of “simulated conversations” between famed designer Miuccia Prada and 
the deceased Elsa Schiaparelli.
1
  Before the doors opened to the public, 
however, the exhibit kicked off with the Costume Institute Gala Benefit 
hosted by Anna Wintour, the Editor-in-chief of Vogue.  The gala is a key 
fundraising event for the Costume Institute, with tables priced at $150,000, 
and individual tickets selling between $5,000 and $15,000.
2
  Organizers 
hoped that last year’s Schiaparelli-Prada exhibit would be as popular and 
profitable as 2011’s exhibit on the works of the late designer Alexander 
McQueen.
3
  The McQueen exhibit proved to be one of the Met’s most 
successful events, raising $10,000,000 at the Costume Institute Gala, and 
millions more from the increased admission fees and gift store sales.
4
  
Lavish parties, six-figure donations, and high revenue streams at famed 
museums, like the Met, have drawn attention to the commercial nature of 
such museums despite their being nonprofit and tax-exempt organizations.
5
 
The City of Boston recently increased its requests for payments in lieu 
of taxes (“PILOTs”) from cultural institutions and nonprofits.
6
  PILOTs are 
negotiated voluntary payments made to municipalities by certain tax-
exempt nonprofits.
7
  PILOTs help cover the cost of municipal services 
 
 1.  Press Release, The Metro. Museum of Art, Elsa Schiaparelli and Miuccia Prada’s 
Impossible Conversations at Metro. Museum’s Costume Inst. (May 7, 2012), 
http://www.metmuseum.org/about-the-museum/press-room/exhibitions/2012/schiapa 
relli-and-prada-press-release; see also Suzy Menkes, In Conversation: Miuccia and 
‘Schiap’, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 25, 2012, at 13 (describing the exhibit). 
 2.  See Amy Larocca, The Charity Ball Game, N.Y. MAG., May 21, 2005, 
http://nymag.com/nymetro/shopping/fashion/features/11894/ (noting that “[t]he money 
raised from the sale of tickets . . . constitutes the Costume Institute’s entire annual budget”). 
 3.  See Eric Wilson, McQueen’s Final Showstopper, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2011, at 
ST1 (discussing the success of the McQueen exhibit).  
 4.  Id. 
       5.   See, e.g., Anna Somers Cocks, Loan fees risk killing the goose that lays the golden 
eggs, THE ART NEWSPAPER (July 27, 2008), available at http://www.theartnewspaper.com/a 
rticles/Loan-fees-risk-killing-the-goose-that-lays-the-golden-eggs/8663 (pointing to the fact 
that museums are tax-exempt for having certain charitable goals yet have expensive 
restaurants and stores and lavish parties, and suggesting that museums engaged in such 
activities forget their actual purposes of education). 
        6.   Erica Cooke, This is not a tax, says Boston’s Mayor, ART NEWSPAPER (Jan. 2012), 
available at http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/This+is+not+a+tax,+says+Boston%E 
2%80%99s+mayor/25330.  
 7.  DAPHNE A. KENYON & ADAM H. LANGLEY, PAYMENTS IN LIEU OF TAXES: 
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provided to the nonprofit, but are not deemed taxes.
8
 Such programs have 
existed for decades.
9
  They are now receiving more attention as cities focus 
on them as sources of fresh revenue and pressure more large property-
holding nonprofit organizations to make payments.
10
  The growth of PILOT 
programs illustrates the move toward limiting the benefits of tax 
exemption.
11
  The expansion of the Boston PILOT program may 
foreshadow future changes in the nonprofit world, and may set a significant 
precedent for pressure on large revenue-producing museums to defend and 
justify their tax-exempt status. 
Due to the massive revenue streams and property wealth of some 
famed museums, programs like Boston’s PILOT may impact some 
museums at the local level, and higher levels of government could consider 
possible changes in the tax treatment of museums, especially the more 
profitable institutions.
12
  Many museums, like the Met, have acquired 
worldwide recognition.  While these museums fund much of their 
operations through private donations, admissions, and membership dues, 
they have also leveraged their reputations to pursue various forms of 
profitable activities to help finance their operating budgets and enable their 
growth.
13
  In order to explore the tax treatment of America’s museums and 
to understand why tax exemption benefits are important for museums, even 
profitable museums, this Comment examines museum finances, the role 
 
BALANCING MUNICIPAL AND NONPROFIT INTERESTS 6 (2010), available at 
http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/1853_Payments-in-Lieu-of-Taxes. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  See, e.g., Janne G. Gallagher, Charities Under Siege: Trends in the State and Local 
Tax Treatment of Charities, SB30 ALI-ABA 69, 85 (1996) (noting that PILOTs date back to 
at least 1929 when Harvard first made a payment to the city of Boston). 
 10.  KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 7. 
 11.  Id. at 7 (“Two major factors drive the high level of interest in PILOTs around the 
country: growing scrutiny of the nonprofit sector, and increasing pressure on municipalities 
to find new sources of revenue.”). 
 12.  See Andras Kosaras, Note, Federal Income and State Property Tax Exemption of 
Commercialized Nonprofits: Should Profit-Seeking Art Museums be Tax Exempt?, 35 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 115, 175 (2000) (arguing that stricter application of tax exemption principles 
should apply to museums, and that although they should not lose tax exemption entirely, 
“exacting a fair price for operating their exempt activities as business ventures is entirely 
fair”); see also KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 7 (“Commercial activity in the 
nonprofit sector and news reports scrutinizing the behavior of nonprofit organizations have 
raised issues about the nonprofit property tax exemption, and have possibly reduced public 
support for it.”). 
      13.    See, e.g., Report of the Chief Financial Officer, THE METRO. MUSEUM OF ART 50 
(2011), available at http://www.metmuseum.org/~/media/Files/About/Annual%20Reports/2 
010_2011/Chief%20Financial%20Officer [hereinafter Report of CFO] (noting that the Met 
receives most of its funding from its endowment, donations and admission fees, but that it 
also records revenue from “auxiliary activities” such as restaurants and gift shops). 
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museums play in the community, and the purpose and importance of tax 
exemption for museums. 
In the coming years, it is probable that museums will see increased 
scrutiny of their more commercial activities and of their tax-exempt 
statuses.  Consequently, they may have to defend their tax exemption and 
publicize the impact of their charitable activities.  Although museums have 
not yet been largely impacted by tax reforms, state and local governments 
are pushing for stricter limits on tax exemptionmuseums have reason to 
be wary of possible changes.
14
  To fully comprehend the tax-related issues 
museums confront, and to determine the likelihood of changes in tax policy 
toward museums, Section I of this Comment explores the purpose and 
current operations of museums, particularly the large, world-renowned 
institutions.  Section II briefly explains the federal tax exemption of 
museums and addresses the fact that, at the national level, tax exemption is 
a settled norm and museums are unlikely to see changes in their federal tax 
treatment.  Section III considers the tax treatment of the commercially-
driven operations of museums.  Section IV discusses the Commerciality 
Doctrine and its likely impact on museums, and Section V explores state 
nonprofit tax exemptions, which tend to be less uniform, less established, 
and more conservative than federal tax exemptions.  Museums may find 
their tax exemption questioned at the state level based on commercial 
activities conducted on exempt property or due to changes within state laws 
or policies that tighten the definition of organizations that qualify for tax 
exemption.  Finally, Section VI discusses the current use of PILOTs for 
property tax-exempt nonprofits and the likelihood that museums will be 
pressured to make contributions.  While much of this Comment applies to 
nonprofits in general, this discussion addresses specific and unique issues 
for museums, such as improving public perceptions of their charitableness, 
the operation of commercially oriented activities, reasons for tax 
exemption, and the threat of local requirements for payments in lieu of 
taxes. 
I. MUSEUMS IN AMERICA 
A. The Role Museums Play—Education and Entertainment 
The American Alliance of Museums, in its Code of Ethics for 
 
 14.  See, e.g., Rick Cohen, Packard Museum Struggling to Retain Tax Exemption, 
NONPROFIT QUARTERLY (June 12, 2012, 12:57 PM), http://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/polic 
ysocial-context/20484-packard-museum-struggling-to-retain-tax-exemption.html 
(highlighting a debate about the extent to which a museum’s “non-charitable revenue-
generating activities affect its tax-exempt status”). 
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Museums, defines a museum as an institution that “[makes] a ‘unique 
contribution to the public by collecting, preserving, and interpreting the 
things of this world.’”
15
  By comparison, the federal government defines a 
museum as “a public or private nonprofit agency or institution organized on 
a permanent basis for essentially educational or aesthetic purposes, which, 
utilizing a professional staff, owns or utilizes tangible objects, cares for 
them, and exhibits them to the public on a regular basis.”
16
  While 
museums vary as much as these definitions do in their approaches to 
education and preservation, American museums tend to embrace both 
missions. 
Charles Wilson Peale founded one of the first American public 
museums.
17
  In establishing and heading the Philadelphia Museum, Peale 
created a framework for current museum governance.
18
  Peale promoted 
museum access “to both the learned and the unwise.”
19
  Peale understood 
that the promise of education alone rarely attracts many visitors; he 
therefore aspired to make “culture not to be difficult and somehow painful, 
but fun and uplifting and entertaining.”
20
  Phineas T. Barnum purchased 
Peale’s collection in 1840 and focused on entertainment, thus transforming 
the museum experience and marking a distinct change in museum 
operation and purpose.
21
  Barnum opened the American Museum in New 
York City, which became a national landmark, amusing and entertaining 
visitors with exhibits of “freaks” and novelties alongside collections of arts 
and artifacts.
22
  At the time, the American Museum was praised as having 
 
 15.  Eugene Dillenburg, What, if Anything, Is a Museum?, EXHIBITIONIST, 2011, at 8, 
available at http://name-
aam.org/uploads/downloadables/EXH.spg_11/5%20EXH_spg11_What,%20if%20Anything
,%20Is%20a%20Museum__Dillenburg.pdf (quoting the AAM website).  However, the 
AAM website page that originally listed this definition has since been taken offline.  
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Liane Hansen, Philadelphia Museum Shaped Early American Culture, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO, July 13, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=92388477. 
 18.  See id. (“[N]ot only did [Peale] create the first museum, but he created the first 
marketing campaigns, the first solicitations for gifts to his museum . . . .”). 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  A History of Museums, ‘The Memory of Mankind’, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, Nov. 24, 
2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=97377145 [hereinafter 
A History of Museums];  see also John Richard Betts, P.T. Barnum and the Popularization 
of Natural History, 20 J. HIST. OF IDEAS 353 (1959) (suggesting that Barnum should be 
credited with making museums a popular form of American entertainment); see also Harold 
Skramstad, An Agenda for American Museums in the Twenty-First Century, 128 DAEDALUS 
129, 131 (Summer 1999) (noting that the museum governance of Barnum and Peale was a 
preface for the evolution of museums in America). 
 22.  See Betts, supra note 21, at 353–-55 (discussing the “novelties” Barnum added to 
his exhibits, including animals, such as orangutan and elephants, as well as “pictures, 
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“served science and education well.”
23
 
The head of the American Alliance of Museums has suggested that 
“[m]useums are a part of the community . . . [but] their role is not well-
understood or well-publicized.”
24
  Museums have long provided education 
to the American populace, and that remains their overarching goal.
25
  
However, most museums also find it necessary for their survival and 
success to entertain and amuse as well as to educate.  Promoting 
entertainment has transformed the reputation of museums to the point 
where many no longer “think about museums as being a critical piece in 
our educational infrastructure in this country” or realize the community 
benefits museums provide.
26
 
“[T]he American museum universe is more like the Milky Way than 
the solar system,” therefore making it difficult to generalize the 
characteristics of a typical museum.
27
  Today, so-called “superstar 
museums” offer the ultimate museum experience.
28
  Superstar museums 
share certain key characteristics:  they draw tourists, attract large numbers 
of visitors, exhibit famous works, are located in buildings celebrated for 
their unique architecture, and gain revenue from commercial activities 
while also benefiting the local economy.
29
  The Met is one example of a 
 
articles or curiosities.”); KARL E. MEYER, THE ART MUSEUM: POWER, MONEY, ETHICS 92 
(1st ed. 1979) (pointing to Thomas Pearsall Field Hoving as another influential figure in the 
entertainment archetype because of his “splashy shows, head-line catching acquisitions, and 
continuous capital expansion”). 
 23.  Betts, supra note 21, at 357. 
 24.  A History of Museums, supra note 21. 
 25.  See Kosaras, supra note 12, at 118–22 (noting that two of the first American 
museum directors, John Cotton Dana and Paul J. Sachs, emphasized the educational goals of 
museums, despite disagreeing on strategies to further those goals.  Dana saw a museum as 
only serving its function if it benefitted the public, and thought that it should be centered in 
a metropolis so to educate as many people as possible.  On the other hand, Sachs believed 
that museums should not serve as “a public playground,” but rather as a place for scholars to 
learn and research.). 
 26.  A History of Museums, supra note 21. 
 27.  MEYER, supra note 22, at 58.  One important distinction between museums is how 
they are operated.  According to a 2012 study, approximately sixty percent of museums are 
privately operated and forty percent are run by the government, with only seven percent of 
these managed by the federal government.  The Gale Group, Museums and Art Galleries, 
HIGHBEAM BUSINESS, (last visited Apr. 8, 2013), http://business.highbeam.com/industry-
reports/business/museums-art-galleries (noting that most of the museums in the Northeast 
are privately operated and that government museums are more common in the South and 
West of the United States.).  Museum ownership, organization, and funding sources relate to 
the type of financial scrutiny museums receive. 
 28.  Bruno S. Frey & Stephan Meier, The Economics of Museums, in HANDBOOK OF THE 
ECONOMICS OF ART AND CULTURE 1018, 1035 (Victor A. Ginsburgh & David Throsby eds., 
2006). 
 29.  Id. at 1036–37. 
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superstar museum.
30
  Other examples include the Guggenheim, the 
Museum of Modern Art, and the J. Paul Getty Museum (“Getty”).
 31
  These 
museums have followed Barnum’s model, merging entertainment and 
education to create famed institutions.  However, these same superstar 
museums have sparked debates about profit-seeking and tax exemptions.  
Due to such attention, superstar museums should consider their public 
image and take care not to allow their business-minded operations to 
overshadow their charitable and tax-exempt missions in the eyes of the 
public, the state, and the local municipality.  This Comment focuses on 
these “superstar museums” because of their influence and ability to 
provoke tax reforms that impact all museums.  
 
B. Museum Operating Income and Funding 
There are at least 17,000 museums in America, and they annually host 
more than 800 million people for free or at a nominal fee.
32
  The average 
price for admission is about seven dollars, and about one-third of museums 
do not charge any admission.
33
  The median cost to  museums per visitor is 
about $31.40, which forces museums to allocate part of their operating 
budgets toward subsidizing admission.
34
 
Early-era American museums derived their funding from “men of 
fortune and estate.”
35
  Today, the average museum receives 24.4% of its 
funding from the federal, state, or local government; 36.5% from private 
donations; 27.6% from earned income; and 11.5% from investment 
income.
36
  Corporate donations comprise a substantial proportion of 
operating income, but, in the wake of the recession, many corporate and 
private donors have reduced their donations to museums.
37
  Government 
 
      30.    Id. 
      31.    Id. 
 32.  A History of Museums, supra note 21. 
 33.  Ford W. Bell, How are Museums Supported Financially in the U.S.?, EMBASSY OF 
THE UNITED STATES (Mar. 2012), available at http://photos.state.gov/libraries/amgov/13 
3183/english/P_You_Asked_How_Are_Museums_Supported_Financially.pdf. 
 34.  Monday Musings: The Price of a Free Membership, CTR. FOR THE FUTURE OF 
MUSEUMS (Dec. 3, 2012), http://futureofmuseums.blogspot.com/2012/12/monday-musings-
price-of-free-membership_3.html. 
 35.  Calvin Tomkins, MERCHANTS AND MASTERPIECES: THE STORY OF THE 
METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART 21 (1989); see also Bell, supra note 33 (noting that private 
donations are the largest source of income for museums comprising about thirty-six percent 
of museum operating income, while about twenty-five percent is supported by government 
funding). 
 36.   Bell, supra note 33. 
 37.  See Jim Zarolli, Museums Exhibit Signs of Economic Distress, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, 
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funding also has declined, as economic downturns left cities unable to 
support local museums.
38
  Furthermore, shrinking endowments have left 
many museums in difficult financial positions.
39
  Since museums “must 
stitch together sustainable revenue streams from a range of sources, while 
being as much at the whim of the marketplace as for profit enterprises,” 
they have been forced to increase attention to profitable activities and 
fundraising so as to avoid auctioning collection pieces or shutting down 
entirely.
40
 
For a large source of revenue, museums depend on admissions, 
membership dues, and retail profits; these sources make up a median of 
18% of museum operating budgets.
41
  Museums, especially superstar 
museums, also report modest income-producing endowments.
42
  The Met, a 
superstar museum with a much larger operating budget and revenue stream 
than the average museum, stated in its 2011 Annual Report that its revenue 
amounted to $226.2 million.
43
  The Met outlined its sources of revenue as 
follows:  37% from its endowment, 22% from gifts and grants, 14% from 
admissions fees, 11% from membership dues, 6% from New York City 
utilities, 5% from New York City guardianship and maintenance, and 5% 
 
Jan. 5, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99017732 (discussing 
the Queens Museum of Art, which relies primarily on corporate and private donors, who 
“have lost a lot of money in the stock market” ).  Recently, however, “there are signs that 
things are starting to look up” for charities.  Pam Fessler, Charities Predict A Slight 
Increase in 2012 Donations, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, Jan. 4, 2012, 
http://www.npr.org/2012/01/04/144659584/charities-predict-a-slight-increase-in-2012donat 
ions. 
 38. See, e.g., Zarolli, supra note 37 (discussing “the hard-pressed city government[‘s]” 
need to cut $400,000 from the budget for the Queens Museum of Art).  
 39.  See András Szántó, Will US Museums Succeed in Reinventing Themselves?, ART 
NEWSPAPER (Jan. 2010), available at  http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Will-US-
museums-succeed-in-reinventing-themselves-/20030 (stating that museum endowments 
shrank greatly during the recession, and that the largest institutions were the most affected). 
 40.  Bell, supra note 33; see also Edward Wyatt, Museum of Contemporary Art Takes 
Broad’s Lifeline, Appoints New Chief, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2008, 12:09 PM),  
http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/23/museum-of-contemporary-art-takes-broads-
lifeline-appoints-new-chief/ (explaining that the Museum of Contemporary Art in Los 
Angeles had to be bailed out by philanthropist Eli Broad because, although it has “one of the 
country’s most esteemed collections of postwar art. . . .its equally esteemed and ambitious 
exhibitions program ha[d] for several years outstripped its financial means, causing the 
museum to eat through most of its endowment and land in a deep financial crisis”). 
 41.  Press Release, Am. Ass’n of Museums, AAM Releases Survey-Offers Fin. 
Snapshot of Museum Field (Nov. 13, 2006) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of Business Law).  
 42.  See Bell, supra note 33 (noting that money from investments tends to comprise 
about 11.5% of museum revenue). 
 43.  Report of CFO, supra note 13, at 50.  
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from auxiliary activities such as gift shops, parking, and restaurants.
44
  The 
Met’s Annual Report reveals that a large percentage of the institution’s 
revenue depends on unstable sources that are heavily linked to the 
economy.  The Met and similarly situated museums have therefore had to 
focus attention on other sources of revenue in order to make up for market 
instability in traditional revenue sources. 
Although superstar museums report large revenue streams considering 
their nonprofit status, most superstar museums also report high operating 
costs that correlate with their revenue streams.  In 2005, museums allocated 
a median of 46% of spending toward meeting their missions, and 9% 
toward caring for their general collections.
45
  Personnel costs amounted to a 
median of 51% of museums’ operating budgets.
46
  The Met reported 
operating expenses of $224.9 million in its 2011 Annual Report, a figure 
relatively close to its annual revenue.
47
  The Met spends 29% of its 
operating budget on curatorial expenses, 18% on maintenance and 
operating services, 17% on guardianship, 11% on administration, 7% on 
utilities and interest, 7% on membership and development, 6% on 
education and libraries, and 5% on its special exhibits.
48
 
Public misperception regarding museum profits may be at the root of 
criticism toward museum tax treatment.
49
  With media portrayals of 
museums as buyers and holders of multi-million dollar pieces, owners of 
prime real estate, and employers capable of providing for-profit level 
director salaries and perks, it may seem reasonable to assume that superstar 
 
 44.  Id.  Note that revenue from fundraising events, like the previously mentioned 
Costume Institute Gala at the Met, is recorded as gifts and donations.  See 2010 ANNUAL 
REPORT, THE FIELD MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY 8 (2010), 
http://fieldmuseum.org/sites/default/files/2010_Annual_Report.pdf (citing the revenue for 
the Field Museum in Chicago as $68 million and derived as follows:  17% from long-term 
investments, 16% from admissions, 14% from business enterprises, 11% from contributions, 
10% from net assets used, 10% from government support, 9% from Chicago Park District, 
5% from program service fees, 4% from membership dues, 3% from sponsorships, and 1% 
from other sources). 
 45.  AAM Releases Survey-Offers Financial Snapshot of Museum Field, supra note 41. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Report of CFO, supra note 13 (the amount cited excludes auxiliary activities). 
 48.  Id.; see also 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 44 (citing for the year 2010 an 
operating budget of $64.7 million for the Field Museum of Natural History with expenses as 
follows:  twenty-one percent on collections and research, twenty percent on other museum 
services, thirteen percent on debt service, twelve percent on exhibitions, nine percent on 
business enterprises, seven percent on environment, culture and conservation, six percent on 
marketing and public relations, five percent on institutional advancement, four percent on 
education and its library, and three percent on administration). 
 49.  But see MEYER, supra note 22, at 59, (noting that “criticism has been directed at 
[museum] performance as distinct from their existence,” and that “nearly everybody, 
approves of the establishment of museums”). 
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museums do not deserve tax exemption.  Therefore, in order to avoid 
incorrect assessments of wealth, museums need to educate the public on the 
costs of collection maintenance and programming because in today’s 
unstable economy financial responsibility is vital to a museum’s existence.  
Notably, the Met stated that only five percent of its reported revenue was 
derived from tangential and more commercially driven activities.
50
  
Nevertheless, people focus on the inflow of money rather than considering 
the source or type of revenue, and the substantial costs of running a 
museum. 
 
II. FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION OF MUSEUMS 
Both the federal government and each of the fifty states provide tax 
exemption for nonprofit organizations that meet certain requirements.
51
  
Tax-exempt museums deny federal, state, and local municipalities a large 
source of revenue.
52
  This untaxed revenue has garnered attention in recent 
years as museums and other charitable organizations, such as hospitals and 
universities, have drawn criticism
53
 for transforming into what Andras 
Kosaras has termed “commercialized nonprofits.”
54
 
In order to analyze whether museums are likely to be affected by 
public pressure it is necessary to understand the basic structure of the 
current tax system.  Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (“the 
Code”) allows income tax exemption for organizations that meet the 
 
 50.  Report of CFO, supra note 13; see also Kosaras, supra note 12, at 133-37 
(suggesting that museums have organized their finances so as to profit from tax-exempt 
activities and to avoid the Unrelated Business Income Tax and arguing that museums have 
become more profit-seeking in their tax-exempt activities and should be taxed for those 
gains).  
 51.  KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 10. 
 52.  See e.g., Keith Schneider, Adding Profits to the Gift Shop, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 
2006, at G31 (noting that America’s museums, which are largely tax-exempt, collectively 
amass about $5.9 billion in revenue a year). 
 53.  See KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 9 (“increasing public scrutiny has led to 
challenges of nonprofits’ tax-exempt status”); see also Sebastian Smee, Masterpieces on 
loan leave MFA Walls Lacking; The museum is sharing a glut of its most prized works, 
raising funds but frustrating some local supporters, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 25, 2012, at 
A1 (“After all, why should [museums] be deserving of tax-free status, of donations from 
businesses and the rich, of being considered superior to ordinary commercial life if they 
themselves become so commercial as to rent out their collections?”) (quoting Cocks, supra 
note 5).  
 54.  Kosaras, supra note 12.  But see Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for 
Charities a Subsidy?, 64 TAX L. REV. 283, 289 (2011) (suggesting that income tax 
exemption is only relevant when looking at dollars set aside rather than dollars spent on 
yearly operating expenses, since such costs are usually deductible). 
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“exempt purposes” cited in the provision.
55
  To qualify as a “charitable 
organization” with tax-exempt status, an organization’s mission must 
further an approved purpose, either “charitable, religious, educational, 
scientific, literary, testing for public safety, fostering national or 
international amateur sports competition, [or] preventing cruelty to children 
or animals.”
56
  Museums qualify under section 501(c)(3) because of their 
educational purposes.
57
 
To differentiate a tax-exempt organization from a non-tax-exempt 
organization, the IRS applies an organizational test and an operational 
test,
58
 based on the requirement that “an organization must be both 
organized and operated exclusively for one or more of the purposes 
specified in [section 501(c)(3)].”
59
  To satisfy the test, “the organizational 
documents must limit the mission of the organization to one or more 
exempt purposes; limit the organization’s power to engage in non-exempt 
activities . . . and provide that the organization’s assets must be distributed 
for other related exempt purposes upon dissolution.”
60
  The operational test 
focuses on behavior and whether the organization seeking section 501(c)(3) 
status operates in a way that meets the exempt purposes listed in the 
Code.
61
   
Section 501(c)(3) entities are divided into private foundations and 
public charities.
62
  Public charities receive more favorable tax treatment 
 
 55.  26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)–1 (2013). 
 56.  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), (last updated Jan. 14, 2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
Charities-&-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/Exempt-Purposes-Internal-Revenue-
Code-Section-501(c)(3). 
 57.  See Kosaras, supra note 12, at 128 (”The Treasury Regulations specifically qualify 
museums for tax exemption as “educational” organizations”); see also Micah J. Burch, 
National Funding for the Arts and the Internal Revenue Code §501(c)(3), 37 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 303, 332–33 (2010) (suggesting that the Code be revised to specifically provide arts 
organizations tax exemption rather than having them fall under the category of an 
educational charity, thereby lessening the tension between education and commerciality in 
arts organizations). 
 58.  Kosaras, supra note 12, at 128. 
 59.  26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)–1; see also Burch, supra note 57, at 326 (noting that there 
is a “sliding scale” of commercial activities to charitable activities on which an organization 
can fall and that the amount of commerciality allowed while remaining tax-exempt is based 
on the charitable purpose of the organization). 
 60.  Kosaras, supra note 12, at 128–29. 
 61.  See id. at 129 (“The test will not be met only if ‘more than an insubstantial part of 
its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose.’”) (quoting Treas. Reg. 
§1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1)). 
 62.  Adler & Colvin, Qualifying for Public Charity Status: The Section 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) 
and 509(a)(1) Test and the Section 509(a)(2) Test, (2003), available at 
http://www.adlercolvin.com/pdf/public_charities/A%20C%20Web%20Resource%20-
%20Qualifying%20for%20Public%20Charity%20Status.%20The%20(00167455).PDF. 
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than private foundations, but must qualify for public charity designation 
under section 509 of the Code.
63
  Under the Code, an organization can 
qualify as a public charity in three ways:  “(1) by being a certain kind of 
institution, such as a church, school, or hospital; (2) by meeting one of two 
mathematical public support tests; or (3) by qualifying as a supporting 
organization to another public charity.”
64
  Museums are most likely to be 
classified as public charities under the public support test.
65
 
The Code prohibits an exempt organization from benefiting any 
private shareholder or other individual, and from taking political action, 
such as by lobbying for changes in legislation.
66
  The Code does not 
disqualify organizations from tax exemption for profit-seeking activities as 
long as the organization’s mission is not commercial.
67
  However, the IRS 
has created an exception in section 513 of the Code, the Unrelated Business 
Income Tax (UBIT).
68
  Section 513 was enacted by Congress in 1950 in 
response to complaints of unfair competition by businesses conducting 
similar activities as tax-exempt organizations.
69
  Section 513 defines 
“unrelated trade or business” as: 
any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially 
 
 63.  VIRGINIA G. RICHARDSON & JOHN FRANCIS REILLY, PUBLIC CHARITY OR PRIVATE 
FOUNDATION STATUS ISSUES UNDER IRC 509(A)(1)-(4), 4942(J)(3), AND 507 (FY 2003) 2–3, 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicb03.pdf.  
 64.  Adler & Colvin, supra note 62 see also Developments in the Law—Nonprofit 
Corporations: III. Tax Exemption, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1612, 1616 (1992) [hereinafter 
Developments in the Law] (“The law of tax exemption cannot be understood without 
interpreting the term charitable.  The term implies both a statutory definition of a category 
of exempt activities, and a common law requirement that the organization must advance 
charitable ends.”); see also Developments in the Law, supra note 64, at 1616 (“[U]nderlying 
all relevant parts of the Code, is the intent that entitlement to tax exemption depends on 
meeting certain common-law standards of charity—namely, that an institution seeking tax-
exempt status must serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established public 
policy.”) (quoting Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)). 
 65.  See Internal Revenue Manual 4.76.3, I.R.S., http://www.irs.gov/irm/pa 
rt4/irm_04-076-003.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2013) (defining the public support test as 
requiring that the organization receive at least one-third of its funding from public 
contributions, or, if the organization receives between 10% and 33.33% from public 
contributions, facts and circumstances as stipulated by the treasury must show that the entity 
is organized and run like a public charity and not a private organization.); Adler & Colvin, 
supra note 62 (providing general information about the various tests). 
 66.  See Developments in the Law, supra note 64, at 1618-19 (specifying that any 
organization that engages in such activity will not be exempt from taxation). 
 67. Id. at 1617.  Although profit-seeking activities do not disqualify an institution, 
income from commercial activity that does not mean that income from the commercial 
activity will be entirely untaxed if the Unrelated Business Income Tax provision (section 
513) may still apply.  
 68.  I.R.C. § 513 (2006). 
 69.  Kosaras, supra note 12, at 130–31. 
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related (aside from the need of such organization for income or 
funds or the use it makes of the profits derived) to the exercise or 
performance by such organization of its charitable, educational, 
or other purpose or function constituting the basis for its 
exemption under section 501.
70
 
The UBIT taxes unrelated business income of section 501(c)(3) 
entities at corporate tax rates.
71
  This provision affects profits tangentially 
related to a museum’s educational purpose, such as revenue from museum 
restaurants or gift shops.
72
  The UBIT is interpreted and applied broadly, 
creating confusion over what constitutes unrelated business income for an 
organization’s section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt purpose.
73
  For this reason, the 
government has considered reforms to UBITs.
74
  Although there have been 
no recent formal changes to UBITs, there may be changes in the 
application of UBIT as nonprofits become more commercial and it 
becomes increasingly difficult for the IRS, and nonprofits, to separate types 
of income streams.
75
 
The public, although harboring misconceptions about museum 
finances, has increasingly begun to ask why such charitable organizations 
are tax-exempt when they receive hefty donations, maintain endowments, 
and profit from business-like ventures.
76
  Some argue that commercially-
driven museums do not deserve the same level of tax exemption as other 
charities, citing the amount of earned income such museums seemingly 
 
 70.  I.R.C. § 513 (2006). 
 71.  I.R.C. § 511 (2006).  The top tax bracket for corporations, (taxed at a rate of thirty-
five percent35%, applies to taxable income in excess of $10,000,000.  I.R.C. § 11 (2006).   
 72.  Kosaras, supra note 12, at 133. 
 73.  Id. at 171. 
 74.  During the “Hearing on Public Charity Organizational Issues, Unrelated Business 
Income Tax and the Revised Form 990” on July 25, 2012, the IRS heard arguments and 
suggestions for reform of UBIT.  PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, HOUSE OVERSIGHT 
SUBCOMMITTEE TAX-EXEMPT HEARING FOCUSES ON COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES, COMPLEX 
STRUCTURES, AND FORM 990 REDESIGN 1 (July, 31, 2012), http://www.pwc.com/en_US/u 
s/washington-national-tax/newsletters/exempt-organizations-tax/assets/pwc-hearing-public-
charity-organizational-issues.pdf.  At the hearing, John Columbo, a professor at the 
University of Illinois College of Law, recommended that Congress “subject income earned 
by a public charity from all commercial activities to UBIT, regardless of whether the 
activity was substantially related to the organization’s exempt purposes.”  Id. at 4.   
 75.  See id. (evidencing the concern over the application of UBIT). 
 76.  See Smee, supra note 53 (“[G]reat lending museums like the MFA ‘risk killing the 
goose that lays the golden eggs.  After all, why should they be deserving of tax-free status, 
of donations from business and the rich, of being considered superior to ordinary 
commercial life if they themselves become so commercial as to rent out their collections?’”) 
(quoting Cocks, supra note 5).  But see Frey & Meier, supra note 28 (suggesting that 
museums pursue commercial activities in response to reduced funds from other sources of 
revenue). 
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receive tax-free, the trend toward commercially-driven activities, and the 
notion that tax exemption has become less essential to museum survival.
77
 
These criticisms have developed partly because the IRS has not articulated 
why section 501(c)(3) tax exemptions exist in the first place,
78
 and because 
fundamentally, “[t]here is nothing about the nature of the charitable 
organization that precludes income taxation. . . . [because it] often intends 
to make a profit and its income can be measured in the same way as for-
profit companies.”
79
  Despite this, nonprofit tax exemption is well-
established at the federal level and is unlikely to be greatly altered.
80
 
Professor Nina J. Crimm suggests that tax exemption is a way for the 
government to reward nonprofits for “undertaking the provision of 
‘inherently risky’ public goods and services.”
81
  This public benefit 
reasoning “is based on the theory that the government is compensated for 
the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burdens which would 
otherwise have to be met by appropriations from other public funds, and by 
the benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.”
82
  
Subsidy theory suggests that tax exemptions subsidize organizations that 
provide a benefit to society, thereby relieving the government from a duty 
 
 77.  See, e.g., Kosaras, supra note 12, at 155 (arguing that museums should not be fully 
tax-exempt, because “museums are moving to a point where profitability is not an incidental 
benefit of exempt activities, but the primary goal. . . . If exempt organizations choose to 
emulate for-profit firms, they should be taxed like them.”); see also, Cocks, supra note 5 
(positing that museums are losing sight of their real purposes). 
 78.  Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for 
Charitable Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419, 426 
(1998).  
 79.  Halperin, supra note 54, at 284. 
 80.  See Developments in the Law, supra note 64, at 1620 (noting that the subsidy 
theory is the most accepted view of why nonprofits are tax-exempt).  Other theories of tax 
exemption for nonprofits include donative theory, income measurement theory, and capital 
formation theory.  Id.  Donative theory suggests that nonprofits should be tax-exempt 
because they run on donations.  See also Kosaras, supra note 12, at 167 (noting that 
donative theory depends on “the proposition that there is near universal agreement that 
donative organizations . . . are and should be exempt from taxation.”).  Income measurement 
theory suggests that nonprofits are tax-exempt because it is difficult to quantify nonprofit 
income.  Developments in the Law, supra note 64, at 1620.  As much museum revenue is 
“readily quantifiable,” income measurement theory does not offer a sound explanation for 
museum tax exemption.  Kosaras, supra note 12, at 166.  Capital formation theory, on the 
other hand, supports tax exemption because of the limits placed on nonprofits to raise 
capital through securities markets.  Developments in the Law, supra note 64, at 1620. 
 81.  Crimm, supra note 78, at 420.  Professor Crimm also suggests that the logic behind 
tax exemption should be considered separately from specific issues of which organizations 
should be tax-exempt.  Id. at 420. 
 82.  NSFRE GOVERNMENT RELATIONS COMMITTEE, PAYMENTS IN LIEU OF TAXES 2 
(1997) [hereinafter NSFRE] (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 [938]), 
available at http://www.afpnet.org/files/contentdocuments/pilot_position_paper.pdf. 
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to provide such services.
83
  Subsidy theory can be separated into 
government burden theory and community benefit theory.
84
  Government 
burden theory proposes that tax exemptions extend to nonprofit 
organizations that provide a service that the government would otherwise 
be expected to provide.
85
  In comparison, community benefit theory 
suggests that tax exemptions subsidize the activities nonprofits provide that 
benefit the community.
86
  Museums house, preserve, and protect cultural 
works and identities—tasks the government would be unable to undertake 
without spending billions of dollars.  Museums also provide unique public 
benefits, including education, entertainment, community activities, and 
tourism revenue.  The federal government therefore has an interest in 
continuing tax exemptions as a subsidy for the benefits provided by 
museums. 
Commentators point out that the subsidy theory requires 
acknowledgement that tax exemptions, as a subsidy, are essentially 
government expenditures on nonprofits.
87
  This raises concerns of resource 
scarcity and allocation efficiency, considering that those who are the least 
in need of help receive the most support.
88
  Museums that can raise their 
own resources may not seem as worthy of such a discount from the federal 
government.  These institutions, however, arguably have a broader impact 
because of their ability to reach a wider segment of society; by this logic, 
the subsidy rationale posits that larger museums do deserve a government 
subsidy for providing greater benefits that the government finds valuable.  
Such a government tax subsidy can be compared to one of the biggest tax 
subsidies—healthcare—which represents a major policy initiative 
undertaken through the tax code.
89
  In the case of museums, the tax subsidy 
 
 83.  Developments in the Law, supra note 64, at 1620.  However, subsidy theory is not a 
complete explanation of tax exemption because it does not explain why such a subsidy 
needs to be provided through the tax law rather than in other forms.  Id. 
 84.  Kosaras, supra note 12, at 166. 
 85.  Id.  Kosaras dismisses this theory by claiming that there is no clear relief of 
government burdens by museums. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  See e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 64, at 1621 (“Critics of tax 
expenditures point to the inefficiency of tax expenditures in allocating scarce government 
resources.”). 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  See CATO HANDBOOK FOR POLICYMAKERS, CATO INSTITUTE 141–42 (7th ed. 2008) 
available at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymaker 
s/2009/9/hb111-14.pdf (noting that employer-provided healthcare that is employer-deducted 
and available as an employment benefit is not taxable to the employee, and is the largest 
employer tax break and causes the government to lose billions of potential dollars in 
revenue); Eric Pianin, Top 10 Tax Breaks that May be Eliminated, THE FISCAL TIMES, Sept. 
13, 2012, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2012/09/13/Top-10-Tax-Breaks-that-May 
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fosters arts and culture. 
Financial support of museums is an accepted governmental activity in 
the Western Hemisphere “because of the way in which it affects the quality 
of our cultural life . . .  [and because] [t]he market on its own fails to 
properly account for [the] sociological/political/aesthetic qualities of art.”
90
  
Most countries maintain ministries of culture and provide more direct 
national support for the arts.
91
  In the United States, however, cultural 
development is furthered largely through the tax treatment of museums; 
because these tax provisions are “tucked away in provisions of the federal 
tax code that do not even use the word ‘art,’ they remain somewhat 
insulated from . . . discourse regarding arts funding.”
92
  The United States 
promotes both museums and cultural development through tax exemption 
laws.
93
  Although increased scrutiny of nonprofits, and specifically 
museums, may lead museums to fear formal calls for tax reform, the 
federal government is unlikely to revoke tax exemption, even for the 
largest, most well-known museums.  To do so would be, in a way, revoking 
national promotion of educational programming in the humanities and the 
protection of priceless collections.
94
 
 
-Be-Elimated.aspx#page1 (stating that the foregone revenue to the federal government from 
tax subsidies to healthcare totals around $184.4 billion); Developments in the Law, supra 
note 64, at 1620 (“Tax expenditures ‘represent government spending for favored activities 
or groups, effected through the tax system.”) (citations omitted). 
 90.  Burch, supra note 57, at 310–11. 
 91.  Bell, supra note 33. 
 92.  Burch, supra note 57, at 303; see also Elizabeth Blair, Does U.S. Need a Culture 
Czar?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, (Jan. 16, 2009, 6:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/sto 
ry.php?storyId=99450228 (noting the government’s disjointed approach to the arts and 
culture in the United States); Christopher Beam, What do Ministers of Culture Do?, SLATE, 
(June 29, 2007, 6:36 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explain 
er/2007/06/what_do_ministers_of_culture_do.html (noting that in the United States, the arts 
are largely privately funded and there is little government support compared to abroad).  
Other nations tend to support the arts more openly, and “assistance to the arts is a discrete 
and visible expenditure in the national budget.”  MEYER, supra note 22, at 64.  Professor 
Micah Burch suggests that tax subsidies as applied in the United States are beneficial in that 
they remove the decision-making required in allocating direct funding.  Burch, supra note 
57, at 321.  Note that the United States does maintain the National Endowment for the Arts, 
but its budget is much smaller than that of most other countries.  For example, “the 
government subvention for Italy’s major opera houses is nearly ten times larger than the 
annual Arts Endowment working budget.”  NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, HOW THE 
UNITED STATES FUNDS THE ARTS v (2d ed. 2007), available at   
http://infousa.state.gov/life/artsent/docs/how.pdf.  European nations also offer tax benefits to 
the arts but these have tended to not be as large as the tax benefit in the United States.  
NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, supra note 92. 
 93.  Burch, supra note 57, at 304.  
 94.  Id. at 306 (“[A]rts policy is an important indicator of how the United States 
supports creative endeavors generally.”). 
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III. MUSEUM OPERATIONS THAT HAVE RAISED CRITICISM OF MUSEUM 
TAX EXEMPTION 
Museums have two main goals:  to educate their visitors, and to obtain 
funding.
95
  Museums may prioritize their duties to educate the public and 
protect cultural, artistic, and scientific works, but to fulfill the charitable 
aim of education, they must meet their operating budgets.  Some argue that 
because “[a]rt museums are moving to a point where profitability is not an 
incidental benefit of exempt activities, but the primary goal,” they should 
not be allowed tax exemption for such activities.
96
  While profitable 
activities may not be directly connected to charitable goals, raising capital 
from any source is vital to the furtherance of public benefits and education.  
With donations (which once served as the main support for museums) on 
the decline, and costs to sustain museum activities and the protection of 
priceless pieces on the rise, museums have been forced to tap into other 
sources of revenue to stay afloat and to stabilize their budgets.
97
 
Critics of museum marketability and profit-making seem to suggest 
that since museums are tax-exempt nonprofits, they must not operate as 
businesses or seek revenue.  However, the Code realizes the possibility of 
profit-seeking nonprofits and allows exempt organizations to run profitable 
activities as long as their overall mission remains charitable.
98
  Revenue 
from tangential and commercial activities is funneled back into museum 
operations and helps to support museums’ tax-exempt purposes.
99
  Plus, in 
today’s economy, business-minded governance is important in helping 
museums meet their funding requirements. 
Museums raise capital through profitable ventures such as gift shops, 
restaurants, blockbuster exhibits, private events, and loan arrangements.  
Such activities are often not captured by the UBIT exception, because 
UBIT explicitly excludes unrelated business that is “substantially 
related . . . to the exercise or performance by such organization of its 
 
 95.  Sandra Mottner & John B. Ford, Measuring Nonprofit Marketing Strategy 
Performance: The Case of Museum Stores, 58 J. BUS. RESEARCH 829, 829 (2005). 
 96.  Kosaras, supra note 12, at 155.  But see Frey & Meier, supra note 28, at 1035 
(stating that museums often have to become more commercial to make up for reduced 
funding from other sources). 
 97.  Many nonprofits have been forced toward such a model.  Organizations like the 
Red Cross, the National Alzheimer’s Association, and the Susan G. Komen Fund have held 
events and galas with celebrities and expensive tickets to raise revenue toward their 
charitable purposes. 
 98.  Developments in the Law, supra note 64, at 1617. 
 99.  Frey & Meier, supra note 28, at 1035. 
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charitable, educational, or other purpose or function constituting the basis 
for its exemption . . . .”
100
  Many museums, especially superstar museums, 
also own expensive real estate in the center of cities, and, since most are 
exempt from property taxes, tax exemption for these valuable holdings also 
garners negative attention.  It is such aspects that many find difficult to 
reconcile with tax exemption and which need to be explored in detail to 
determine how much of such activity is actually tax-exempt and whether 
that which is not tax-exempt should be. 
 
A. Gift Shops and Retail Outlets 
Today, retail outlets have become a common fixture in museums—an 
internet search for “museum gift shop” will generate hundreds of links to 
gift shops at museums worldwide.
101
  Museums profit from purchases at 
on-site shops, as well as from online and offsite stores, and for superstar 
museums revenue can be in the millions of dollars.
102
  Superstar museums, 
like the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) or the Met, are examples of 
institutions that have capitalized on their reputation to launch successful 
offsite stores.
103
  Notably, offsite stores are not property tax-exempt 
because offsite stores are seen to have a clear commercial nature that is less 
connected to museum operations.
104
  In its 2011 annual report, the Met 
reported revenues of $68,160,000 in income from “merchandising,” but 
expenses of $64,153,000,
105
 while the MoMA reported income from 
“auxiliary activities,” including gift store profits, as $50,493,000 and 
related expenses of $47,507,000.
106
  However, for the average museum, the 
 
 100.  I.R.C. § 513(a) (2006). 
 101.  See AAM Releases Survey-Offers Financial Snapshot of Museum Field, supra note 
41 (noting that eighty percent of museums that responded to the AAM survey operate a gift 
store). 
 102.  See Schneider, supra note 52 (noting that the Met generated $39 million in profits 
in 2003 from sales of commodities, and that the Museum of Modern Art reaped $12.5 
million in profits from gift store sales). 
 103.  See MoMA Store, THE MUSEUM OF MODERN ART, http://www.momastore.org/muse 
um/moma/StoreCatalogDisplay_-1_10001_10451_ (listing offsite stores in Japan and 
Korea) (last visited Apr. 8, 2013); see also International Locations, THE METRO. MUSEUM 
ART STORE, http://store.metmuseum.org/the-met-store-locations/international-
locations/scat/international/ (listing off-premises stores in Thailand, Australia, Japan, and 
Mexico as well as eight stores in the United States) (last visited Apr. 8, 2013). 
 104.  Kosaras, supra note 12, at 158. 
 105.  Report of CFO, supra note 13. 
 106.  Annual Report for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2011, THE MUSEUM OF MODERN 
ART (2011), http://www.moma.org/docs/about/AnnualBondDisclosureFY2011.pdf; see also 
2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 44 (reporting that Chicago’s Field Museum derived 
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net profits from retail sales are relatively small.  The Museum of Fine Arts 
(MFA) in Boston, a wealthy museum subject to PILOTs, stated in its 2011 
annual report that it spent $6,472,000 on merchandising operations and 
earned $6,870,000 from such operations, earning a net profit of only 
$398,000.
107
 
Museum stores are unique retail sites in that they are intended to be 
profitable while at the same time serving the greater mission of the 
museum—education and enlightenment of visitors.
108
  These dual aims can 
be met and museum shops are able to avoid paying UBIT by ensuring that 
the products sold are related to their exhibits and collections.
109
  It is not the 
case that the sale of such items is tax-exempt due to a loophole in UBIT.  
The IRS has considered the sale of gift store items that are related to a 
museum’s collection and has determined that they should not be subject to 
UBIT because they further the charitable mission of the museum by 
educating more people about the museum’s collections.
110
  Stores carry a 
wide variety of goods, from prints of paintings and art history textbooks to 
souvenir magnets, and so each item must be considered separately for 
application of UBIT.
111
  For tax purposes, museums are incentivized to 
ensure that the majority of products sold are substantially connected to 
museum collections or purposes.
112
 
 
fifteen percent of its sixty-eight million dollar operating budget from “business 
enterprises”). 
 107.  Museum of Fine Arts Annual Report, MUSEUM OF FINE ARTS (2011), 
http://www.mfa.org/annual-report-2011/downloads/MFA-operatingResults2011.pdf. 
 108.  Mottner & Ford, supra note 95, at 830. 
 109.  Kosaras, supra note 12, at 134 (“[W]here the primary purpose behind the sale of 
the item is ‘utilitarian, ornamental, a souvenir in nature, or only generally educational in 
nature,’ the income generated from the sale of the item will be subject to UBIT.”).  
Although museums may have to pay UBIT on some items, it is likely that the products are 
sold due to their expected popularity and after tax, such goods still net a profit and provide 
much needed revenue to the museum.  Id. at 137 n. 118. 
 110.  See Susan R. Bills, Keeping Ahead of UBIT Consequences of a Gift Shop, J. TAX’N 
OF EXEMPT ORGS. 3 (2001) (referencing the IRS Revenue Ruling Rev. Rul. 73-105, 1973-1 
CB 264 in which a gift shop sold reproductions of works in the museum’s collection, books 
and souvenirs).  As Bills notes, although the IRS concluded that sale of such items related to 
the charitable purpose of the museum should be excluded from UBIT, the IRS found that 
items with no relationship to the work in the museum or art generally were subject to UBIT; 
these items included scientific books and city souvenirs.  Id. 
 111.  Id. (noting a process known as the “fragmentation rule,” where the IRS has issued 
private letter rulings that analyze individual items in a gift store to determine whether they 
further the charitable purposes or should be subject to UBIT). 
 112.  Some museums have been creative in connecting goods to the museum’s exhibits.  
See, e.g., Stephanie Murg, Pigments of Their Imagination, ARTNEWS, at 28 (Jan. 2012) 
(announcing that the Guggenheim has launched its own interior paint brand, Classical 
Colors by Guggenheim, which is based on color palettes in famous works showcased at the 
museum). 
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B. Dining Facilities 
Restaurants are another feature that add not only to the museum 
experience, but also to a museum’s revenue.  At superstar museums 
restaurants have evolved from little cafes serving sandwiches and drinks to 
trendy eateries or fine dining establishments that are destinations 
independent of the museums in which they are housed.
113
  These restaurants 
may not be fully tax-exempt because many museums, especially superstar 
museums, outsource restaurant operations to private for-profit companies 
that pay taxes on income generated.
114
 
Taxation on income from food establishments may depend on public 
access to the dining facility.
115
  For example, if a restaurant is only 
accessible through the museum, the restaurant is considered a convenience 
to visitors that furthers charitable purposes and therefore is not subject to 
UBIT.
116
  The IRS has reasoned that museum restaurants further the 
charitable purposes of the museum by allowing visitors to optimize their 
time at the museum, rather than having to leave the museum when 
hungry.
117
  However, if a restaurant can be accessed via a separate entrance 
and is thus open to the public at large without a museum admission fee or 
during hours when the museum is not open to the public, then museum 
revenue from the restaurant is taxable.
118
  Most of the trendy dining 
facilities in superstar museums are open to the public, making them subject 
to taxation.  However, it is possible that small cafeteria-style shops may 
escape UBIT and taxation.
119
 
 
 113.  See, e.g., Larry Rohter, After the Putti, the Baby Calamari, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 
2010, at C21 (noting that the days of museum basement cafeterias “are gone, or at least 
numbered.  Increasingly museums are moving away from the middle-school approach to 
feeding visitors, . . . in favor of stylish restaurants that offer fine dining to go with the fine 
art”). 
 114.  See id. (illustrating that many of the famed restaurants found in museums are 
operated by private companies or restauranteurs).   
 115.  See Jeffrey Hurwit, Candlelight, A Glass of Wine, and UBIT: A Food and Facilities 
Primer, HURWIT & ASSOCIATES 1 (2008) http://www.hurwitassociates.com/p_l_unrelated_c 
andlelight.pdf (“[I]f a dining facility is accessible not only through the museum but also 
through a door directly to the street, then it has been held by the IRS not to be primarily for 
visitor convenience but for general public use, and therefore taxable.”).  
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Restaurant is not Unrelated Business, 72 J. TAX'N 121 (1990). 
 118.  Id.  But see Hurwit, supra note 115 (noting that the fragmentation rule applied to 
gift shops is also used for restaurants, in that income can be separated based on whether the 
money is generated by museum visitors or the outside public). 
    119.  See Hurwit, supra note 115, at 1-2 (noting that a museum restaurant that was “larger 
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C. Blockbuster Exhibits 
Museums, especially superstar museums, attract attention from 
“blockbuster exhibits.”
120
  Blockbuster exhibits are limited-time events 
showcasing famous works, and tend to draw large audiences willing to pay 
the extra charges.
121
  Blockbuster exhibits provide unique education and 
programming and are normally a response to the community’s interests, 
and their profits reflect that.
122
  Blockbuster exhibits, although often 
profitable, do wholly further the charitable purpose of museums to educate, 
and so revenue generated remains tax-free.
123
 
While admission to blockbuster exhibits may be expensive, that price 
tag seldom reflects net profit as money raised is often funneled back into 
the museum.
124
   Without larger admissions fees and heavy advertising, 
museums may not be financially capable of bringing such collections to 
their communities since lending fees are often millions of dollars.
125
  
 
than needed for visitors and staff” did not qualify under the convenience exclusion for a 
variety of reasons, including its size, outside advertisements, and lack of admission fees). 
 120.  See, e.g., Emily Bauman, To Blockbuster or Not to Blockbuster, F NEWSMAGAZINE, 
Apr. 6, 2009, http://fnewsmagazine.com/2009/04/to-blockbuster-or-not-to-blockbuster/ 
(defining “blockbuster exhibits” as exhibits that “draw in huge crowds of out-of-towners 
and, thereby, huge sums of money for both the museums that host them (which often charge 
an additional fee for admission to the special exhibitions), the cities they are in, . . . the 
galleries that surround them, the curators who produce them, collectors who own works by 
artists in the shows, and more”); see also Kosaras, supra note 12, at 160 (“The attraction of 
a blockbuster exhibition is not only the sheer number of people it can attract, but also the 
opportunity to charge extra admissions for admittance to the exhibition, apart from 
admittance to the museum’s general collections.”). 
 121.  See E.H. Gombrich, The Museum: Past, Present and Future, 3 CRITICAL INQUIRY 
449, 460 (1977) (noting that museums’ special exhibitions entice locals to visit the museum 
to see something that is only available for a limited time).  Compare Van Gogh Up Close, 
PHILA. MUSEUM OF ART, http://www.philamuseum.org/exhibitions/743.html?page=2&ticke 
t=1 (last visited Apr. 8, 2013) (listing the admission price of a recent Van Gogh exhibit at 
the Philadelphia Museum as $25.00), with Plan Your Visit, PHILA. MUSEUM OF ART, 
http://www.philamuseum.org/visit/12-270.html (lasted visited Apr. 8, 2013 (listing the 
normal admission price to the Philadelphia Museum of Art for a two-day period as $20.00). 
 122.  See Gombrich, supra note 121, at 460 (noting “tourism social pressure” that 
encourages people to go to special exhibits). 
 123.  Kosaras, supra note 12, at 160.  
   124.   See Bauman, supra note 120 (implying that revenue from blockbuster exhibitions 
may simply plug holes in a museum's existing budget:  "[D]uring recessions, or when public 
funding has been cut, or even during a renovation, the publicity and funds that a blockbuster 
can bring to a museum can prove invaluable.").  
 125.  See e.g., Tyler Green, Pay Per View, PORTFOLIO.COM, May 12, 2008, http://www.p 
ortfolio.com/culture-lifestyle/culture-inc/arts/2008/05/12/Art-Museums-Charging-Big-Fees/ 
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Importantly, blockbuster exhibits offer a wider community benefit in that 
they tend to draw tourists, thereby raising revenue for the municipality and 
other local businesses.
126
 
 
D. Lending 
The other side of the transaction is the lending of portions of general 
collections at high rates.  In the past, museums would charge to cover the 
expenses of transporting and caring for the pieces, but now there is profit 
involved in lending.
127
  For example, in 2008 the Art Institute of Chicago 
loaned the Kimbell Art Museum in Texas ninety-two Impressionist 
paintings at a fee of two million dollars.
128
  As noted by the Met, loaning 
pieces or collections is regarded as furthering the charitable purposes of a 
museum, as loans educate and expose a larger populace to the pieces.
129
  
Not only do museums raise revenue from lending out their collections, but 
many superstar museums have procured deals to expand abroad, often in 
return for a hefty donation from the local government.
130
  The Guggenheim, 
 
(discussing a loan of ninety-two paintings for $2 million dollars). 
 126.  See Urban Partners, Technical Memorandum: Economic Impact of the Salvador 
Dali Exhibition (July 28, 2005), available at http://c0526532.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspaceclou 
d.com/Economic_Impact_of_the_Salvador_Dali_Exhibition.pdf (studying the economic 
impact of the Salvador Dali exhibit on the city of Philadelphia and noting that the exhibit 
was viewed by over 370,000 people, caused about 52,000 trips to other Philadelphia tourist 
spots, benefited at least 145 local business owners, created at least 830 full time jobs, and 
produced tax revenue measured at $2.17 million for Philadelphia and $2.29 million for the 
state of Pennsylvania). 
 127.  See Kosaras, supra note 12, at 161 (“Until the 1990s, . . . most loans were 
conducted ‘at cost.’ . . . Since the 1990s, several institutions have entered into loan 
arrangements for the purpose of raising money for capital improvements.”); Bauman, supra 
note 120 (noting that blockbuster exhibits may not only make money for the hosting 
museum, but also raise “hefty sum[s]” for the lending museum). 
 128.  Green, supra, note 125; see also Kosaras, supra note 12, at 162 (noting that the 
Whitney Museum charged the San Jose Museum of Art $1.4 million for a loan and in the 
1990s the Barnes Foundation charged about $7 million for part of its collection to tour Paris 
and Tokyo, but pointing out that for the Barnes Foundation this was the alternative to selling 
pieces from the collection to finance general museum operations). 
 129.  See Collections Management Policy, THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, (Nov. 
12, 2008), http://www.metmuseum.org/about-the-museum/collections-management-policy#l 
oans (calling loans “an important means of fulfilling the educational and scholarly purposes 
of the Museum’s charter”). 
 130.  See, e.g., Sheppard Mullin, Would You Like Fries with that Picasso? The 
International Franchising of World Class Museums, ART L. GALLERY BLOG (Jan. 29, 2009), 
http://www.artlawgallery.com/2009/01/articles/museums-private-collectors/would-you-like-
fries-with-that-picasso-the-international-franchising-of-world-class-museums/ (discussing 
international museum franchising and a recent $1.3 billion “cultural accord” between France 
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once just a New York City fixture, can now be found in Venice, Bilbao, 
Berlin, and Abu Dhabi.
131
 
The increase in lending fees is partly due to the higher costs of 
shipment and insurance, but some argue that lending museums are making 
profits on the agreements.
132
  However, the director of the Art Institute of 
Chicago suggests that high prices do not necessarily indicate that such 
loans are offered to raise revenue.
133
  When considering the revenue gained 
from the borrowing of collections, lending fees do not appear exorbitant or 
solely revenue generating.
134
  Lending agreements and expansion provide 
necessary funding, thereby suggesting a rationale for museums to take 
advantage of traditional supply and demand economics.
135
 
 
E. Renting Museum Property and Ticketed Events 
Private and museum-sponsored functions are also a source of earned 
income.  Many museums, including the Met, charge large sums to rent out 
their facilities.
136
  Others host ticketed after-hours events, such as the 
American Museum of Natural History’s “A Night at the Museum,” a $129 
 
and the United Arab Emirates to open a Louvre franchise in Abu Dhabi); Kosaras, supra 
note 12, at 162–63 (noting that when the Bilbao branch of the Guggenheim opened in 1997 
the Basque government signed a seventy-five year agreement to cover the construction of a 
$100 million structure, the creation of a $50 million acquisition fund, the payment of a one-
time $20 million fee to the Guggenheim, and the subsidizing of the new museum’s annual 
$12 million budget). 
 131.  Annual Report 2010, THE GUGGENHEIM (2010), http://www.guggenheim.org/image 
s/content/pdf/foundation/ar2010.pdf. 
 132.  See Green, supra note 125 (noting that “industry watchdogs” argue that museums 
should be able to cover the costs of lending but should not be able to profit as they appear to 
be doing in recent lending agreements). 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. (noting that the loan from the Art Institute of Chicago to the Kimbell Art 
Museum in Fort Worth, which cost the Kimbell Art Museum $2 million, would generate the 
Kimbell Art Museum more than $8 million). 
 135.  See Alan Riding, A Gleaming New Guggenheim for Grimy Bilbao, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 24, 1997, at C9 (explaining that the Spanish government paid for the construction of 
the Guggenheim Bilbao Museum, created a $50 million dollar acquisitions fund for the 
museum’s expansion, made a $20 million dollar payment to the Guggenheim, and agreed to 
subsidize the Guggenheim’s $12 million dollar annual budget in return for the Guggenheim 
lending part of its New York collection to Bilbao and running the museum’s operations).  
Government support and private donations in the United States do not reach this level, and 
with costs of museum operations so high, when another country is willing to foot the bill, it 
may be reasonable for museums to take advantage of such hospitality. 
 136.  See Entertaining at the Met, THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, 
http://www.metmuseum.org/about-the-museum/entertaining-at-the-met (last visited Apr. 16, 
2013) (providing information on the Met’s private entertainment venues). 
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sleepover at the Natural History Museum.
137
  Renting of museum space is 
considered a passive source of revenue for tax treatment, and is therefore 
excluded from UBIT.
138
  Revenue produced has a close connection with 
usual museum business and charitable goals; by renting out museum spaces 
and opening the museum for special after-hours access, the museum is 
increasing viewership of its collections and increasing its educational 
reach. 
There are also large fundraising events, like the previously discussed 
Costume Institute Gala at the Met, which raise museums millions of dollars 
in tax-exempt donations.
139
  Renting museum space provides opportunities 
for a unique museum experience and meets the overarching goal of 
educating and enlightening visitors, and money raised from such events 
offset the costs of allowing such access. 
 
F. Property Holdings 
According to a 1997 study, 1,904, or forty-four percent, of museums 
own real property.
140
  This number may seem low because many museums, 
including some superstars, do not own the buildings in which they 
operate.
141
  For many museums, like the Met or the Philadelphia Museum 
of Art, the city owns the buildings that house their collections.
142
  However, 
there are museums like the Guggenheim for which the city does not own 
the museum’s building.
143
  This latter type of museum, attracts the most 
 
 137.  AMNH Sleepovers, AM. MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY, http://www.amnh. 
org/plan-your-visit/amnh-sleepovers (last visited Apr. 8, 2013) (describing sleepover events 
at the American Museum of Natural History). 
 138.  I.R.C., IRM § 7.27.6, available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-027-
006.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2013); see Hurwit, supra note 115 (noting that if the museum 
provides services in addition to renting out the space, such as catering, then such activities 
are taxable). 
 139.  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
 140.  KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 17.  The Lincoln Institute of Land Policy 
report cites data on real estate ownership and notes that the average tax savings to museums 
owning real estate is $133,682 per year. 
 141.  See Pamela Skillings, The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York City’s Famous 
Met Museum, ABOUT.COM, http://manhattan.about.com/od/artsandculture/a/metmuseum 
nyc.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2013) (noting that New York City owns the Met’s main 
buildings and also provides much of the building’s utilities); Administration, PHILA. 
MUSEUM OF ART, http://www.philamuseum.org/information/43-323.html  (last visited Apr. 
8, 2013) (noting that Philadelphia owns the building in which the Philadelphia Museum of 
Art is situated). 
 142.  Skillings, supra note 141. 
 143.  Guggenheim New York, USA: Architecture Information, E-ARCHITECT, 
http://www.e-architect.co.uk/new_york/guggenheim_new_york.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 
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attention from states and municipalities because of the revenue lost due to 
the property tax exemption for museum real estate.  These may be at 
particular risk for state challenges and PILOTs. 
 
IV. THE COMMERCIALITY DOCTRINE 
The commerciality test has been considered as a way to limit profit-
seeking nonprofits.
144
  The commerciality doctrine is a non-statutory tool 
that brings income earned by certain commercial activities into the realm of 
taxation and can operate as a way to successfully challenge a nonprofit's 
tax-exempt status.
145
  It focuses on profits when considering tax exemption, 
and measures whether there is a “commercial hue” in the nonprofit’s 
activities, and whether such “activities are largely animated by [a] 
commercial purpose.”
146
  The test analyzes the “manner in which an 
exempt organization undertakes an activity,” rather than the purpose for 
which the nonprofit commences the activity, which UBIT considers.
147
 
The commerciality doctrine originated in a 1924 Supreme Court 
decision on a challenge to the commercial activity of a nonprofit religious 
group that owned real estate and stocks and had retail activity.
148
  It was 
expanded in 1945 by the Supreme Court and applied in a line of 1960’s 
cases to deny tax exemption to nonprofits that were publishing and selling 
materials for profit.
149
  There are two tests under the commerciality 
doctrine—the counterpart test and the aggregation test.
150
  The counterpart 
test considers whether the nonprofit is directly competing with for-profit 
 
2013) (stating that the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation owns and operates the 
Guggenheim Museum on Fifth Avenue).  
 144.  John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 487, 495 (2002); Kosaras, supra note 12, at 140. 
 145.  Kosaras, supra note 12, at 137–40.  
 146.  Id. at 139 (quoting Better Bus. Bureau of Wash., D.C., Inc. v. United States, 326 
U.S. 279, 283 (1945)); see also Colombo, supra note 144, at 503–04 (noting that the 
consideration of a nonprofits activities having a commercial hue has not been systematically 
applied by the IRS or courts and citing as examples the Third Circuit, which stated that a 
charity should be able to turn a profit in order to further its charitable goals and the IRS’s 
approval for tax exemption of hospitals and universities opening health clubs with for-profit 
type fees, noting though that income from such activities is subject to UBIT). 
 147.  Kosaras, supra note 12, at 138. 
 148.  Colombo, supra note 144, at 497–98 (noting that this organization’s tax exemption 
was not revoked because the court found that the commercial enterprises were a small 
portion of overall activities, but that the case is the first to have considered a nonprofit’s 
commerciality). 
 149.  Kosaras, supra note 12, at 138–39. 
 150.  Id. at 138–39. 
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firms in its activities, and the aggregation test notes the difference between 
nonprofits that conduct profitable activities as part of their larger operations 
and those that do so as their main purpose.
151
 
IRS regulations suggest that if the commercial activity is insubstantial 
compared to overall charitable activity that is acceptable, and that tax-
exempt status is affected only if the commercial activity is “substantial,” 
with the exception that if the activities are “in furtherance of an exempt 
purpose,” they are excusable from taxation.
152
  However, the issue is 
confused by the fact that the IRS sometimes applies the stricter 
commerciality doctrine’s limit on commercial activity, which does not 
usually consider the charitable purposes for the commercial activity, and 
that neither courts nor the IRS have created a clear rule in addressing 
commercial activity of nonprofits.
153
 
Unless its scope is expanded, the commerciality doctrine is unlikely to 
be applied to museum shops or profitable ventures, since such commercial 
activities, despite garnering attention as museums increase their focus on 
these enterprises as sources of revenue, are never the main purpose of 
museums.
154
  Such activities do adhere to the Code’s allowing nonprofits to 
earn revenue through commercial activity as long as the primary purpose of 
the organization is a charitable mission under section 501(c)(3).
155
  Under 
the commerciality doctrine, museums accused of excessive commercial 
activity and competing with for-profits may fail the counterpart test, but 
will most likely pass the aggregation test because commercial activities 
further their main charitable purpose and do not exist as a separate goal or 
function on their own.
156
  Therefore, while museums should pay attention 
to the method in which they conduct their profitable activities and should 
 
 151.  Id. at 138–39. 
 152.  Colombo, supra note 144, at 504. 
 153.  Id. at 501–03. 
 154.  See Kosaras, supra note 12, at 140 (suggesting that although museums may fail the 
counterpart test, the aggregation rule offers protection from the commerciality doctrine.  
Kosaras cautions that this view is narrow and that museums could fall within the 
commerciality doctrine if museum are considered to provide entertainment, in which case 
almost the entire operation of the museum may fail the counterpart test and would suggest 
museum purposes to be entertainment for the aggregation test).  While this is one argument 
to suggest the commerciality doctrine can be expanded, it requires a very broad reading of 
the commerciality doctrine and is therefore unlikely to be applied based on the precedent. 
 155.  David A. Brennan, The Commerciality Doctrine as Applied to the Charitable Tax 
Exemption for Homes for the Aged: State and Local Perspectives, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 833, 
847 (2007) (noting that under the commerciality doctrine “it is not necessary that an 
institution seeking tax-exempt charitable status be ‘exclusively’ charitable, only that it be 
‘primarily’ so”). 
   156.    But see Kosaras, supra note 12, at 140 (suggesting that this is an overly narrow 
take). 
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be aware of the commerciality doctrine, the likelihood that they will be 
affected, based on the way it is currently applied, is remote. 
 
V. STATE AND LOCAL TAX EXEMPTION 
State governments tend to apply similar tax principles to charitable 
organizations as those imposed by the federal government.
157
  State law 
regarding nonprofits is not uniform, but generally allows for property tax 
exemption, as well as income tax exemption for museums.
158
  On average, 
states lose about five percent of property tax revenue from tax-exempt 
nonprofits.
159
  Since museums, especially superstar museums, tend to sit in 
large metropolises with high concentrations of nonprofits, the lost source of 
revenue from exempt organizations in these cities can be drastic.
160
 
At the state level, tax exemption is not as settled as it is federally.  
Seventeen states mandate charitable exemption in their constitutions, while 
twenty-five states provide for charitable exemption constitutionally but do 
not require it, thereby leaving the specifics within the control of the 
legislature and courts.
161
  Most states base tax exemption on charitable 
purposes similar to those required of section 501(c)(3) organizations at the 
federal level, and so museums are often exempt from state tax due to their 
educational missions.
162
  To meet the requirements of property tax 
exemption, twenty-seven states require that an organization qualify under 
section 501(c)(3).
163
  Many states then apply a narrower test to section 
501(c)(3) organizations to establish that tax exemption is warranted.
164
  
Often a two-part test is used to exempt a nonprofit from property tax—first, 
that the organization be a nonprofit that does not benefit any shareholders, 
 
 157.  Id. at 117. 
 158.  Id. at 141; see also KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 10 (noting that state 
property tax exemption for nonprofits is based on precedential case law that dates back to 
British common law, but that annual property tax exemption only became the accepted 
standard in the 1830s). 
 159.  KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 18. 
 160.  See id. at 18, 23 (noting that a high density of nonprofits reduces tax revenue in big 
cities, considering that major revenue-producing hospitals and educational institutions, 
along with other nonprofits, including museums, may cause a city to forego a massive 
amount of tax dollars and suggesting that Boston loses over $340 million merely from 
universities and hospitals exemptions). 
 161.  See id. at 11 (citing Louisiana and New York as states that mandate charitable 
exemption in their constitutions; and Florida, Texas, Massachusetts, California, and 
Pennsylvania as states that constitutionally provide for tax exemption but do not mandate it).  
 162.  Kosaras, supra note 12, at 142. 
 163.  KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 11. 
 164.  KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 11. 
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and second, that “its assets must be irrevocably committed to serving 
charitable purposes.”
165
  Seventeen states leave the determination of 
qualification for property tax exemption to local municipalities.
166
  
Generally, the courts play a much larger role at the state level in 
interpreting tax exemption requirements.
167
  Kosaras notes that “the 
statutory language for property tax exemption is sufficiently ambiguous 
concerning arts organizations that the courts have broad discretion in 
characterizing arts organizations as engaging in educational activities or 
merely providers of entertainment . . . ”
168
  Collectively, this means that a 
museum can be tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3), but not under state tax 
laws.
169
 
At the state level, there are two major justifications for property tax 
exemption, according to the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy:  (1) because 
nonprofits provide community benefits and their property is operated for 
the public, such property should not be taxed; and (2) since nonprofits 
benefit the public and relieve the government from the responsibility to 
 
 165.  Developments in the Law, supra note 64, at 1619. 
 166.  KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 11; Developments in the Law, supra note 64, 
at 1620 (noting that state property tax exemption is interesting in that exemption is often 
granted at the state level, but the consequences of tax exemption (lost revenue) are felt more 
by local governments than by the state). 
 167.  KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 12; see Evelyn Brody, All Charities are 
Property-Tax Exempt, But Some Charities are More Exempt Than Others, 44 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 621, 626 (2010) (noting that when state constitutions use limiting terms such as 
“institutions of purely public charity” in order to restrict tax exemption, courts are given 
more discretion in establishing the requirements for nonprofits to obtain tax exemption; 
Brody argues that this contributes to the lack of uniform state tax treatment of nonprofits); 
see e.g. Brody, supra note 167, at 627 (citing Hosp. Utilization Project v. Pennsylvania, 487 
A.2d 1306 (Pa. 1985), as creating limits for exemption by establishing a five-part test that a 
nonprofit must meet in order to be tax-exempt); Kelly Kleiman, Illinois and the Amazing 
Disappearing Property Tax Exemption, SAMEFACTS.COM, Aug. 26, 2011, http://www.sa 
mefacts.com/2011/08/health-care/illinois-and-the-amazing-disappearing-property-tax-
exemption/ (examining an Illinois Supreme Court ruling that stated that there are only three 
types of exempt organizations—religious institutions, schools, and charities—which led to 
three hospitals losing their tax-exempt status and has spurred challenges of other 
nonprofits).  
 168.  Kosaras, supra note 12, at 143.  Kosaras points to the strict application and 
understanding of “educational purpose” to pertain to only “the expansion of knowledge, by 
teaching, instruction or schooling” in New York in the 1970s, which excluded museums 
from tax exemption.  Id. at 143 (quoting Swedenborg Found., Inc. v. Lewisohn, 351 N.E.2d 
702, 706 (N.Y. 1976)). 
 169.  KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 11; see e.g. Cohen, supra note 14 (discussing 
Ohio’s challenge to the state tax exemption of the Packard Museum, which is tax-exempt 
under section 501(c)(3)); Kleiman, supra note 167 (illustrating that the Illinois Supreme 
Court’s ruling may block organizations’ property tax exemption even if they are classified 
as nonprofits under section 501(c)(3)). 
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provide services, that justifies a subsidy in the form of property tax 
exemption.
170
  This latter rationale is very similar to the subsidy theory of 
federal income tax exemption for nonprofits.
171
  However, states rely on 
more than considerations of public support, and many take into account 
public access and general community benefit provided by the 
organization.
172
  In application, Professor Evelyn Brody notes that states 
tend to place more importance on a quid pro quo justification for tax 
exemption as opposed to the federal rationale of subsidizing nonprofits 
because of their charitable nature.
173
 
Since states are not uniform in their treatment of tax-exempt 
organizations, similarly structured museums can be taxed differently based 
on location; thus, museums have to be versed in different state 
requirements and restrictions.
174
  Notably, some states do not allow exempt 
organizations to make a profit, even if such profits are used for charitable 
purposes.
175
  This has a direct effect on superstar museums. 
As more attention is paid to the commercial endeavors of nonprofits, 
some states have questioned whether all nonprofits deserve the same level 
of tax exemption.
176
  Minnesota and Oregon, for example, are two states 
that have examined the amount of public support nonprofits are providing 
for free or at a discount to determine whether they deserve the subsidy of 
 
 170.  KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 10 (pointing out that the second rationale is 
also termed the “quid pro quo theory” and that it has grown in popularity as states have used 
stricter classifications of charitable organizations for the purpose of property tax exemption 
and have relied on the quid pro quo theory to determine eligibility for property tax 
exemption). 
   171.    Kosaras, supra note 12, at 144. 
 172.  Id.; see also id. at 144, n. 160 (citing Commonwealth v. Barnes Found., 159 A.2d 
500, 506 (Pa. 1960) as illustrating the city of Philadelphia pushing for the Barnes 
Foundation to not qualify as a public charity for property tax exemption due to limited 
access for the public and the court stating that even a public library restricts access to the 
public and that is not enough to determine that the art gallery was not a public charity); see 
also KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 12 (“[R]elief of a government burden is not 
normally interpreted narrowly to mean services that government actually provides, but 
rather, services that government views as beneficial.”). 
 173.  Brody, supra, note 167, at 622 (noting also that there are four basic considerations 
for state tax exemption: charitable purposes, court and constitution based tests, donations 
and government assistance, and the role of commercial activities). 
 174.  See KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 12 (noting that states vary in whether 
they allow tax-exempt organizations to charge admissions or fees, or make a profit even if to 
further the organization’s charitable mission). 
 175.  See id.  
 176.  See Stephanie Strom, Tax Exemptions of Charities Face New Challenges, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 26, 2008, at A1 (citing Evelyn Brody as stating that there has been an increase 
in state challenges to property tax exemptions of nonprofits based on their merit for such 
subsidies). 
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property tax exemption.
177
  This suggests that states are indeed moving 
toward a model in which tax exemption is based on a nonprofit’s ability to 
measure and prove its economic benefit.
178
  Quantifying how much is given 
to the public may be difficult for museums, due to the myriad of services 
museums provide directly and indirectly at subsidized or no cost.
179
  Other 
states have considered changing tax laws, such as Louisiana, where the 
Mayor of New Orleans was pushing for constitutional amendments 
allowing the city to tax exempt property.
180
  However, the Mayor decided 
not to pursue such amendments after the release of the New Orleans 
Nonprofit Property Tax Exemption Survey by the Louisiana Association of 
Nonprofit Organizations, which illustrated the need for property tax 
exemption and the harms of revoking the subsidy, citing the important role 
nonprofits play, the reasons that they should be tax-exempt, and the effect 
of reduced donations on nonprofits.
181
  The state of Montana considered 
imposing a requirement that a nonprofit’s property tax exemption be 
reviewed yearly by the Department of Revenue, but dropped the idea due to 
impracticability and cost.
182
  Despite efforts to reform state tax exemption 
of nonprofits, nonprofits have successfully convinced many politicians of 
the necessity of such benefits, thereby staving off far-reaching changes to 
state tax law.
183
  The frequency with which such issues are being raised, 
however, illustrates the shift in public perception toward the role 
nonprofits, including museums, play in their communities. 
Many museums hold large property interests in the center of 
commercial hubs making property tax exemption a huge relief.
184
  A 1997 
study showed that museums on average saved sixteen percent a year from 
the property tax exemption.
185
  For museums, regardless of size, the savings 
 
 177.  Id. 
    178.   Brody, supra note 167, at 622 
 179.  See Maxwell L. Anderson, METRICS OF SUCCESS IN ART MUSEUMS, THE GETTY 
LEADERSHIP INSTITUTE (2004), available at http://www.cgu.edu/pdffiles/gli/metrics.pdf  
(noting that museums present a unique problem in that it is hard to quantify the success and 
benefits of operations and suggesting ways in which museums can measure the fulfillment 
of their purposes such as education). 
 180.  National Counsel of Nonprofits, Taxes, Fees, and PILOTs (Payment in Lieu of 
Taxes) (2012), http://www.councilofnonprofits.org/public-policy/state-policy-issues/govern 
ment-taxes-fees-and-pilots. 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.   See Brody, supra note 167, at 623 (stating that nonprofits have largely been able to 
fend off challenges to their tax exemption and suggestions for state legal reform). 
 184.  See KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 17–18 (showing the savings of different 
types of nonprofits from property tax exemption and noting that nonprofits are often in 
cities). 
 185.  Id. (noting that this includes museums with a full range of incomes and that the 
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of property tax dollars is vital for programming.  Arguments against the 
property tax exemption suggest that rather than subsidizing those 
organizations that most benefit the community, the property tax exemption 
offers the largest subsidies to those organizations with the most expensive 
real estate, and the city is forced to bear the costs while the benefits are 
more widely spread.
186
  While this may be partly true for superstar 
museums, it ignores the direct benefits on local municipalities created by 
these museums.  For example, the total economic impact on the city of 
Philadelphia and surrounding areas from the Salvador Dali exhibit at the 
Philadelphia Museum of Art was measured at a surplus of $54.9 million.
187
  
In turn, this additional revenue generated $2.17 million in revenue for the 
city in the form of taxes.
188
 
States often require that property be owned and operated for charitable 
purposes in order to qualify for tax exemption.
189
  This can cause issues for 
museums operating profitable activities, such as parking lots.
190
  States are 
split on their treatment of property not utilized solely for exempt or non-
exempt purposes.
191
  In some states, an organization may fully lose its tax-
exempt status for commercial operations conducted on premises.
192
  In 
 
median savings is four percent).  Nonprofits earning over ten million dollars receive two-
thirds of overall savings from property tax exemptions despite such organizations 
representing around four percent of nonprofits with property.  Id. at 18.  Superstar museums 
fall within this category of nonprofits generating over ten million dollars in income. 
 186. Id. at 18; see also id. at 11 (noting that local city governments bear the cost of 
nonprofits in their cities, but most nonprofits are appreciated and accessed by people from 
outside the city). 
 187.  Urban Partners, supra note 126, at 103 (measuring the impact as $30.7 million 
directly and $24.2 million indirectly). 
 188.  Id. at 103. 
 189.  See Kosaras, supra note 12, at 145 (observing that there are three main categories 
of property exemption applied at the state level:  “(1) statutes requiring that property must 
be used exclusively for the organization’s charitable purposes; (2) statutes requiring the 
primary or dominant use of the property for the organization’s charitable purposes; and (3) 
statues that allow partial use of the property for other than charitable purposes.”); see also 
KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 13 (noting that many federally exempt organizations 
do pay property taxes because the property they own that is not used for charitable purposes, 
is being held for later development or is being rented). 
 190.  Compare KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 13 (discussing how parking lots 
have become a source of litigation because their operation amounts to a commercial use of 
property without clear furtherance of an exempt purpose), with Bowers v. Akron City Hosp., 
243 N.E.2d 95, 97 (Ohio 1968) (stating that the profits from a parking lot associated with a 
school, hospital or museum do not preclude the parking lot from property tax exemption as 
long as the profits were used toward the expense of providing such a convenience to visitors 
and noting that what is important is the use of the property in question and not the fact that 
profits are made from the property). 
 191.  KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 13. 
 192.  Id.; see also Joanne Huist Smith, Packard Museum Fights for Tax Exemption, 
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other states, property tax is calculated based on the fraction of the building 
employed for non-exempt functions.
193
  Museums, especially superstar 
museums with sizeable or increasing commercial endeavors, may be 
affected by this issue. 
Since state tax exemption as it relates to museums is often unstable 
and poorly defined, museums have reason to worry that fiscally struggling 
states in search of sources of revenue may review and challenge the tax 
exemption of profitable museums.  The Packard Museum in Ohio has been 
so questioned.
194
  The Packard Museum, a federally tax-exempt museum, 
has been challenged on its state tax exemption due to its profitable 
activities—specifically “income it earns from admission fees, the rental of 
the museum for private events, museum store sales, and the rental of 
vintage cars.”
195
  Ohio’s concern relates back to its requirement that tax-
exempt property be used for a proper charitable goal, and that tax-exempt 
property “not be used with a view to profit and cannot be in competition 
with other commercial enterprises.”
196
  Ohio’s challenge of the tax status of 
the Packard Museum may imply that the state is more concerned with the 
economics of tax exemption rather than the rationales behind exemption, 
such as the provision of a benefit to the community, relieving the 
government of a burden, or the financial costs of operating a museum. 
Realizing that state tax exemption is not as clear as federal tax 
exemption, and may often have stricter qualification requirements, 
museums need to be wary of state policies toward nonprofits.
197
  To avoid 
 
DAYTON DAILY NEWS, http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/news/local/packard-
museum-fights-for-tax-exemption-1/nPR8S/ (last updated June 10, 2012, 3:17 PM) (noting 
that the state of Ohio wants to revoke the Packard Museum’s tax-exempt status due to the 
museum charging admissions, renting property for private uses, renting vintage cars, 
operating a gift store and holding a yearly sale of car-parts). 
 193.  KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 13; see, e.g., Property Tax Exemptions in 
Alaska, STATE OF ALASKA (2003), available at http://www.commerce.state.ak.us/ 
dca/logon/tax/tax-exemptions.htm (stating that if a portion of exempt property is used for a 
non-exempt purpose that part of the property that is used for the non-exempt purpose will be 
taxed). 
 194.  See Cohen, supra note 14 (pointing to the implementation of PILOTs and state 
challenges to tax exemption as raising concerns for nonprofits, and specifically citing the 
current issues with the Packard Museum in Ohio). 
 195.  Id.  The author notes that there is a second issue at play with the Packard Museum 
in that the President and CEO of the museum was also the property owner when the 
museum first applied for tax exemption and the museum reports revenue in the millions of 
dollars but has low operating costs which are considered to be under $300,000, but that this 
issue should be considered distinct from non-profit tax exemption concerns. 
 196.  Smith, supra note 192 (quoting Richard A. Levin, former tax commissioner, in the 
most recent rejection of tax-exempt status for the Packard Museum). 
 197.  But see Brody, supra note 167, at 623 (noting that nonprofits have been able to 
rally together to lobby against challenges at local levels to tax exemption). 
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unnecessary scrutiny, museums must ensure compliance with state-specific 
laws and clearly communicate the economic and social benefits they 
provide to their state communities.  Additionally, since profitable activities 
may lead states to question a museum’s charitable status, even if the 
museum is federally tax-exempt, museums would be prudent not to 
generate revenues vastly larger than their operating costs, investment in 
collections, and public services.
198
 
 
VI. PAYMENT IN LIEU OF TAXES199 
Many superstar museums, because of their property holdings and 
appearance of great wealth, are potentially affected by the growth of 
PILOTs.  The recent development of PILOT programs has been attributed 
to a push to limit tax exemption and to expand revenue streams to the state 
or local government.
200
  There is also a correlation between the growth of 
PILOTs and the increase in skepticism toward many nonprofits.
201
  The 
expansion of the Boston PILOT program, currently the largest PILOT 
program, may foreshadow future changes in the nonprofit world, and may 
set a significant precedent for pressure on superstar museums to contribute 
 
 198.  See, e.g., COMMUNITY LEGAL RESOURCES, PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION FOR 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING, LEGAL LINES: LEGAL ISSUES FOR NONPROFITS 3 (2005), http://www.c 
lronline.org/resources/legal-lines/property/propertytax.pdf (noting that the Michigan Court 
of Appeals reversed the Michigan Tax Tribunal’s rejection of tax exemption for the 
Kalamazoo Aviation History Museum with attention to the education the museum provides 
the public, concentrating on the fact that admission fees were low and revenue did not meet 
operating costs, and noting that admission fees were subsidized). 
 199.  PILOTs are defined in the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Report as “payments 
‘made voluntarily by tax-exempt nonprofits as a substitute for property taxes.’”  KENYON & 
LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 4.  There are at least four distinct types of PILOT programs.  
First, PILOTs from a larger government body (like the federal government) to a smaller 
government body (like a state) to reimburse for exempt property.  An example of this might 
be a federal courthouse on city land.  Second, PILOTs from a state to a city for a tax-exempt 
state-run program.  This might be a state university.  Third, government programs such as 
publicly owned utilities, housing authorities or airport commissions contribute PILOTs to 
municipalities from their profits.  Finally, nonprofits that remain tax-exempt can make 
PILOTs to local municipalities for community services the nonprofit otherwise uses free of 
cost.  The focus of this discussion is on the fourth category—PILOTs made by nonprofits to 
municipalities to contribute toward the cost of city provided services.  Edward A. Zelinsky, 
The Once and Future Property Tax: A Dialogue with my Younger Self, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2199, 2215 (2002). 
 200.  See KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 7 (“Two major factors drive the high 
level of interest in PILOTs around the country:  growing scrutiny of the nonprofit sector; 
and increasing pressure on municipalities to find new sources of revenue.”). 
 201.  Id. 
JOHN COMMENT - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2013  12:00 PM 
910 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15.3 
 
tax-like payments at the local level.
202
 
Cambridge, Massachusetts is the first known local government to 
apply PILOTs, dating the program back to 1929 when Harvard University 
started paying PILOTs to the city.
203
  The use of PILOTs has increased 
steadily since then and various versions have been applied in at least 117 
municipalities in 18 different states.
204
  Boston currently runs the largest 
PILOT program in the country and generates the most revenue.
205
 
While PILOT programs have existed for decades, they are receiving 
increased attention as cities are turning to nonprofits as fresh sources of 
revenue to meet increasing city budgets.
206
  In a 1996 study of state and 
local tax treatment of charities, Janne Gallagher suggests that the following 
common municipal issues encourage cities to seek PILOTs: 
 
 Cities that are in poor financial condition because industrial 
and residential flight reduced their tax base, while the 
population that remains is increasingly in need of expensive 
services. 
 A high degree of fragmentation among local 
governments, with a consequent narrowing of any 
particular jurisdiction’s tax base. 
 Heavy reliance on the property tax to finance schools and 
local services. 
 Voter resistance to tax increases, even when growth 
demands more spending, as with the growing number of 
school-age children. 
 The virtual disappearance of federal aid to cities. 
 Cuts in state aid to local governments.207 
Gallagher also notes cities that have “downtown benefit districts,” in which 
extra city services such as security or street cleaning are provided, often 
impose PILOTs on nonprofits.
208
 
The Lincoln Institute of Land Policy report suggests that PILOTs 
 
 202.  See National Counsel of Nonprofits, supra note 180 (noting that several cities are 
considering PILOTs, have requested certain nonprofits pay PILOTs, or are increasing 
requested PILOT payments.  Examples include Hartford, Connecticut; Jamaica Plain, 
Massachusetts; and Providence, Rhode Island.). 
 203.  Gallagher, supra note 9, at 85. 
 204.  KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 2. 
 205.  Id. 
   206.     Id. at 3. 
 207.  Gallagher, supra note 9, at 73. 
 208.  Id. at 88 (listing cities with such downtown business districts, including 
Wilmington, Delaware, and Baltimore, Maryland). 
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target faults in tax exemption policy.
209
  PILOT programs account for the 
skewed application of the property tax exemption, which is to the 
advantage of nonprofits with expensive landholdings rather than those 
offering the most public benefit.
210
  PILOTs also collect contributions that 
cover a nonprofit’s share of municipal services in order to reduce the costs 
that the local community is forced to bear while a much larger population 
uses the nonprofit’s services.
211
  This is often true with superstar museums, 
which serve a broader community and thus allow out-of-town visitors 
access and benefits without their sharing in the cost of subsidizing city 
services.  Museums are generally exempt from property taxes due to the 
benefits and services they provide the state or city thereby releasing the 
government of certain responsibilities.
212
  However, in cities where 
nonprofits, such as superstar museums, have vast land wealth, local 
governments may push for PILOTs because they view certain nonprofits as 
taking more from the community in terms of local services than they 
provide the locality. 
213
 
PILOT agreements tend to be negotiated when land is acquired by a 
nonprofit or tax exemption is requested.
214
  PILOTs may range from the 
more formal and uniform programs, such as the program currently 
implemented by Boston, to case-by-case arrangements, as in most other 
cities.
215
  Calculations and suggested payment amounts tend to vary widely, 
making them difficult to predict and uneven in application.
216
  Some 
scholars consider PILOTs a “middle-ground” because the programs allow 
nonprofits to remain property tax-exempt, while creating agreements 
whereby cities receive some of the funds they require to provide municipal 
services to nonprofits.
217
 
 
 209.  KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 2. 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Id. (“[N]onprofits impose a cost on municipalities by consuming public services, 
such as police protection and roads.”). 
    212.    Kosaras, supra note 12, at 142. 
 213.  Marsha S. Shaines, Legal Issues in Museum Administration, Tax Update, ST024 
ALI-ABA 213, 219 (2012). 
 214.  KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 22 (noting that PILOT negotiations are more 
likely to occur when expansion of a nonprofit includes previously-taxed land). 
 215.  Id. at 6. 
 216.  Id. at 39 (referencing different types of calculations:  Some are based on a 
percentage of what the property tax would be, some are calculated using a measure of the 
size of the property, some are figured based on economic services provided by the nonprofit, 
and others are just ad hoc with no clear logic). 
 217.  Id. at 9.  The Lincoln Institute of Land Policy also notes that there are alternatives 
to PILOTs that can address the mismatch between funding and benefiting from nonprofit 
services, such as state governments providing grants to local governments that have a lot of 
their property held by tax-exempt nonprofits.  Id. at 26.  
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PILOTs are not legally mandated payments.
218
  They are technically 
voluntary gentleman’s agreements, making the negotiations between cities 
and individual nonprofits important to the successful implementation of 
PILOT programs.
219
  Cities implementing PILOTs appear to honor and 
promote the rationales for museum tax exemption—relief of the 
government burden of educating the public and the provision of community 
benefits—by insisting that PILOTs are completely distinct from a 
museum’s tax-exempt status.
220
  By exempting nonprofits from property 
taxes, states and cities are accepting that nonprofits do not have to 
contribute toward city services that are largely supported by property tax 
revenue.
221
  It appears, however, that cities supporting many large 
nonprofits use PILOTs to reduce the economic assistance they provide to 
nonprofits, essentially circumventing nonprofit tax exemption. 
The fact that PILOTs are not enforceable by law distinguishes them 
from compulsory taxes.
222
  PILOTs are considered “nominally voluntary 
outlays by the exempt institution, [but] the political reality is usually more 
complex as the municipality brandishes any number of potential sanctions 
to induce the PILOT payment.”
223
  Some cities go so far as to threaten to 
revoke nonprofit status for those refusing to negotiate PILOTs.
224
  Even if a 
city does not obviously threaten a nonprofit when requesting a PILOT, 
refusing PILOTs after a city’s request can create negative consequences 
and sour the relationship between the nonprofit and the city.
225
  Due to the 
 
    218.   Id. at 6.  
 219.  Id. at 6. 
 220.  See Gallagher, supra note 9, at 90 (advising cities planning on instituting PILOTs 
that they should avoid any language related to tax exemption). 
 221.  See Laurence S. Seidman, PUBLIC FINANCE 252 (2008) (stating that as of 2006, on 
average twenty-one percent of state and local revenue is raised by property tax, and that the 
majority of local governments rely on property taxes for more than half their tax revenue). 
   222.    KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 43. 
 223.  Zelinsky, supra note 199, at 2215–16 (“These sanctions range from the 
municipality marshaling public opinion against the exempt entity if it declines to make 
PILOT payments to the denial of zoning relief or building permits desired by the tax-exempt 
entity to, in the extreme case, the municipality’s threat to seek political or judicial 
revocation of the entity’s tax exempt status.”).   
 224.  Developments in the Law, supra note 64, at 1625 (noting that revocation of tax 
exemption by cities has usually been upheld for hospitals, as well as fitness centers run by 
the YMCA).  In the past, cities have revoked tax exemption, but courts usually overturn 
such city action; however, in unique circumstances where a clear lack of charitable purpose 
exists, courts have affirmed city revocation of property tax exemption.  See id.  Cf. KENYON 
& LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 24 (citing The MacDowell Colony in Peterborough, New 
Hampshire as an example of a city attempting to revoke tax exemption but being overturned 
by the state on the grounds that the organization provided community benefits worthy of tax 
exemption). 
 225.  Shaines, supra note 213, at 219 (suggesting that nonprofits feel pressure to 
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power of city agencies over zoning, building permits, and local services, 
municipalities can create obstacles for nonprofits that refuse to negotiate 
favorable PILOTs.
226
  For this reason, PILOTs tend not to be entirely 
voluntary, and under some definitions may come very close to the nature of 
a tax.
227
 
The amount of revenue PILOTs create for most cities is minimal.
228
  
Theoretically, both the city and its nonprofits further community welfare, 
which suggests that PILOTs merely reallocate resources from certain types 
of community benefits to others.
229
  This raises the question of whether 
such programs are ideal, considering the benefits nonprofits, like museums, 
provide for cities, and whether in the future cities are likely to approach 
museums for PILOTs. 
 
A. PILOTs in Boston 
Boston operates the most formal and highest revenue-producing 
PILOT program in the country.
230
  In 2009, Boston’s Mayor Menino 
initiated a PILOT Task Force to analyze the program and suggest 
 
contribute); see, e.g., KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 24 (discussing a case in which 
the MacDowell Colony was asked to pay a PILOT to account for issues with the Colony’s 
tax exempt-status, and which the MacDowell Colony refused to pay, thus resulting in the 
town denying the organization its previous tax-exempt status). 
 226.  KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 6; see also Zelinsky, supra note 199, at 2216 
(“In practice, it is typically in everyone’s interest to compromise on a ‘voluntary’ PILOT 
payment which is often less than the full taxes that would be paid on loss of exempt status, 
but which, from the municipality’s perspective, provides immediate financial succor.”). 
 227.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1496 (Bryan A. Garner, 8th ed. 1999) (“‘Taxes are 
the enforced proportional contributions from persons and property, levied by the state by 
virtue of its sovereignty for the support of government and for all public 
needs.’  This definition of taxes, often referred to as ‘Cooley’s definition,’ has been quoted 
and indorsed, or approved, expressly or otherwise, by many different courts. While this 
definition of taxes characterizes them as ‘contributions,’ other definitions refer to them as 
‘imposts,’ ‘duty or impost,’ ‘charges,’ ‘burdens,’ or ‘exactions’; but these variations in 
phraseology are of no practical importance.” (quoting 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE LAW OF 
TAXATION 61–63 (Clark A. Nichols ed., 4th ed. 1924))). 
 228. See KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 33 (noting that revenue from PILOTs 
represent a miniscule portion of city budgets and that based on a 1990’s study PILOT 
revenue constituted only .15% of Baltimore’s budget, .54% of Philadelphia’s and 1.37% of 
Boston’s). 
 229.  See NSFRE, supra note 82, at 1 (“The theory behind income tax exemption for 
section 501(c)(3) organizations is that they are providing needed community services 
(‘public good’), and to extract payments for taxes from these organizations would decrease 
the amount of service or ‘public good’ these organizations could provide.”). 
 230.  KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 21 (citing statistics that in 2009 Boston 
received $15.7 million in PILOTs).   
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changes.
231
  In 2010, the Task Force provided suggestions, which included 
making the program more consistent by equalizing PILOTs through a 
uniform method for calculating contributions and broadening the range of 
nonprofits contributing by including nonprofits previously not asked to 
participate.
232
  Boston has subsequently increased its suggested payment 
amounts and has widened its scope, partly by including museums that 
previously did not contribute (original payments were largely from 
educational and medical institutions).
233
 
The Task Force suggestions led Mayor Menino to amend the city’s 
PILOT program.
234
  Boston now requests contributions of nonprofits with 
property holdings over $15 million, and calculates the payment as twenty-
five percent of what the property tax would be.
235
  By exempting $15 
million of property value, the program focuses on larger nonprofits.
236
  
Discount credits of up to fifty percent were recommended, but they 
correlate with the level of benefit the organization is perceived to directly 
provide city residents.
237
  Mayor Menino has defended the program’s 
inclusion of museums and maintains that the program is not equivalent to a 
tax and rather is a request to “increase the ‘voluntary’ contributions cultural 
institutions make through” PILOTs.
238
  However, the fact that the payments 
are considered ‘in lieu of taxes,’ have a formalized and defined method of 
assessment, and are calculated based on what would be the nonprofit’s 
property tax if it were not tax-exempt suggests a strong link between 
PILOTs and taxes.  While PILOTs do provide much needed funding to 
Boston, the revenue they brought in during 2010 accounted for only around 
one percent of the city budget.
239
 
The Boston Museum of Fine Arts (“MFA”), arguably a superstar 
 
 231.  KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 22. 
 232.  Id. at 22–24 (illustrating that the previous program was quite random, an example 
being that Harvard University paid a PILOT of close to two million dollars while Boston 
College gave a payment close to three hundred thousand dollars). 
 233.  See id. at 23 (stating that Boston has pursued museums in its recent requests for 
PILOTs); Pilot Task Force, CITY OF BOSTON (2009), available at 
http://www.cityofboston.gov/assessing/pilot.asp (stating that most of Boston’s tax-exempt 
educational and medical organizations contributed PILOTs pre-2009). 
 234.  Pilot Task Force, supra note 233. 
 235.  KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 29, 38; see also Shaines, supra note 213, at 
219 (noting that Boston’s revised program will be implemented over five years). 
 236.  KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 38; Shaines, supra note 213, at 219. 
 237.  KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 41; see also Cooke, supra note 6, at 13 
(stating that such discount credits will be offered to organizations that positively impact 
Boston residents and not those that indirectly benefit the city through tourism). 
 238.  Malcolm Rogers, Don’t Kill the Goose, ART NEWSPAPER (Jan. 2012), at 214. 
 239.  KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 22; Rogers, supra note 238 (pointing out that 
this small amount of the annual budget did fully cover snow removal costs for the year). 
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museum, had been making payments since 1988, but started to push back 
due to the suggested increase in voluntary contribution.
240
  The MFA made 
a PILOT of $55,000 to the city in 2010/2011, but in 2012, the city 
requested an increased payment of $250,000, increasing to $1,025,000 by 
2016.
241
  Likewise, the Institute of Contemporary Arts was asked to pay 
$17,000 in PILOTs in 2012, but was informed that the fee would increase 
to $86,000 by 2016.
242
  Museums have voiced frustration about being 
excluded from Task Force discussions regarding PILOT amendments due 
to the considerable effect the amendments have on cultural institutions.
243
  
In Boston, disgruntled museums have argued that as nonprofit entities that 
generate social services and income for the city, “there should be 
investment in the arts, not taxation.”
244
 
Though the requested $250,000 contribution is only a small 
percentage of the MFA’s total revenue, it is money that is likely to be 
diverted from programming, salaries, or growth.
245
  Furthermore, there is a 
fear that the increased PILOT payments will harm donations, as 
philanthropists may be deterred from donating if they believe their money 
is used for PILOTs and city services rather than directly supporting the 
museum.
246
  The city, in its quest to tap all sources of revenue, may 
overlook the fact that the current economic environment negatively impacts 
museums as well as municipalities, and, by further squeezing museum 
budgets, the city indirectly may reduce museum services and jobs for 
Boston residents.
247
  If museums were to reallocate funds toward the 
payment of PILOTs, other museum spending would need to be cut, 
 
 240.  Rogers, supra note 238 
 241.  Id. 
 242.  Cooke, supra note 6, at 13. 
 243.  Id. (highlighting that since PILOTs are technically voluntary payments negotiations 
are critical to their success). 
 244.  Id. (citing the director of the MFA). 
 245.  See Eric Weinberger, What the MFA Owes Boston, Why the MFA’s Director 
Should Stop Complaining About the City Looking for Money and Start Opening up His 
Wallet, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 19, 2012, http://www.bostonglobe.com/magazine/2012/0 
2/19/what-mfa-owes-boston/fEpIUXJLl03YJCr1rXDweI/story.html (citing the MFA 
director’s speculations over how the $250,000 would cost the museum employees and 
programming). 
 246.  See Rogers, supra note 238 (noting that the MFA is a fiduciary of the public trust, 
as are many museums, and that donations therefore are made with the intent that they 
provide for a certain benefit); NSFRE, supra note 82, at 2 (citing the NSFRE’s worry that 
philanthropists will change their donating patterns if they realize that their funds are going 
toward PILOTs). 
 247.  See, e.g., Weinberger, supra, note 245 (noting that the MFA believes that having to 
pay increased PILOTs will have a negative effect on other services that the museum 
provides); NSFRE, supra note 82, at 2 (noting that PILOTs may cause nonprofits to raise 
their prices for services or reduce services provided). 
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admissions fees would need to be raised, or more attention would need to 
be given the more commercial aspects of museum operations.
248
   Malcolm 
Rogers, director of the MFA, stated “the PILOT scheme will simply mean 
cuts in [the museum’s] outreach programs and a reduction in jobs.”
249
 
There is a concern that if the Boston program is successful in 
implementing this broad and formal expansion of PILOTs, many other 
large municipalities will follow suit.
250
  Museums are closely monitoring 
the situation in Boston, and there is hope that Boston museums will 
negotiate a more favorable PILOT agreement with the city.
251
 
 
B. Will Many Museums be Affected by Future Implementation of 
PILOTs? 
Nationwide nonprofits are concerned with the possible spread of 
PILOTs.  This makes sense—cities are not transparent in their application 
of PILOT programs and PILOTs are not uniform since they tend to extract 
different contributions from like institutions.
252
  However, the growth of 
Boston’s PILOT program is not necessarily indicative of growth in other 
cities, given that Boston is in a unique position that encourages PILOTs 
due to its high concentration of high revenue-producing nonprofits that 
own property.
253
  Although there is evidence that cities are increasingly 
starting to explore the idea of PILOTs, cities may be unlikely to ask 
museums for PILOTs, since museums are not the traditional PILOT targets.  
Additionally, as noted, PILOT revenue covers a small percentage of city 
expenditures; the effort and resources needed in negotiating PILOTs may 
not be worth the PILOT revenue gained from most museums, which, if not 
tax-exempt, would be subject to low property taxes (recalling that the 
average savings for a museum from property tax exemption is $133,682 
 
 248.  NSFRE, supra note 82, at 2. 
 249.  Weinberger, supra note 245. 
 250.  See Cooke, supra note 6 (citing a Boston City Council election candidate’s 
suggestion that if Boston is successful with PILOTs other cities are likely to consider 
PILOTs as an option as well). 
 251.  Id.  At the time this Comment was written, both the Institute of Contemporary Art 
and the MFA are in discussions with the city regarding their PILOT fees, and there is 
feeling that as a unified coalition more would be gained. 
 252.  EVELYN BRODY ET AL., INSTITUTE ON NONPROFITS & PHILANTHROPY (Aug. 2012), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/412640-The-Charitable-Property-Tax-Exem 
ption-and-PILOTs.pdf; KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 3. 
 253.  KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 21–22 (noting that if taxed, universities and 
hospitals alone would provide 24.6% of city property tax). 
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and the median savings is $20,181).
254
  However, that does not mean that 
museums will not be considered in expansions of existing PILOT programs 
that are attempting to raise more revenue or equalize the use of PILOTs 
across nonprofits. 
Since Boston’s PILOT program expansion made headlines, other 
cities have considered similar strategies to raise revenue. Philadelphia, 
where PILOTs have been implemented for years but which has lost much 
of its contributions, has refocused on its PILOT program.
255
  In 
Connecticut, the city of Hartford has asked larger nonprofits to pay 
PILOTs, and the city of New London requested increased payments from 
hospitals and universities already paying PILOTs.
256
  In Massachusetts, the 
city of Belmont has requested PILOTs amounting to $530,000 of 
revenue.
257
  In New Jersey, several cities are organizing committees to 
consider implementing PILOTs.
258
 
In deciding whether to organize a PILOT program there are several 
issues for municipalities to consider.  PILOTs tend to be unsystematic and 
lack consistent application.
259
  When implementing a PILOT program, a 
city has to decide whether to have an extensive program like Boston's, or to 
approach PILOTs on a case-by-case basis.
260
  Since nonprofits have no 
legal obligation to contribute, it is important for municipalities to negotiate 
with the nonprofits rather than simply impose payments.
261
  Negotiations 
require investment of time and effort, yet funds raised from PILOTs 
compose only a small fraction of city revenue, raising questions of 
administrative efficiency.
262
  PILOTs may not be worth the cost of 
implementation in most cities.  If PILOTs are applied, they may make 
sense only for nonprofits that own large, expensive, and currently untaxed 
real estate, as is the case in the Boston program.
263
  Most cities support few, 
 
 254.  Id. at 17. 
 255.  How Philly Works: An Answer to Increased City Revenue? COMMITTEE OF 
SEVENTY, http://www.seventy.org/OurViews_How_Philly_Works_An_Answer_to_City_Re 
venue.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2013). 
 256.  National Counsel of Nonprofits, supra note 180. 
 257.  Id. 
 258.  Id. 
 259.  KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 3; see also National Counsel of Nonprofits, 
supra note 180 (detailing differences in state taxes, fees, and PILOTs). 
   260.    KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 38. 
 261.  Id. at 3 (noting that individual negotiations are ideal when there are few nonprofits 
worth asking for PILOTs, and a more uniform program is best in cities with more 
nonprofits). 
 262.  Id. at 22 (citing that Baltimore receives 0.33% of its budget from PILOTs, Boston 
receives 0.66%, Detroit receives 0.17%, Pittsburgh receives 0.89%, Providence receives 
0.56% and New Haven is at the high end receiving 1.16% of its revenue from PILOTs). 
 263.  Id. at 22. 
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if any, such nonprofits, and museums make up a small portion of the 
nonprofits that fall within this category. 
The success of PILOTs in Boston is based largely on the fact that 
Boston supports many nonprofits, particularly large educational, medical, 
and cultural institutions with expansive tax-exempt property.
264
  PILOTs 
are found most beneficial to cities that rely on revenue from property 
taxation and also have a large portion of their property wrapped up in 
nonprofit activities.
265
 
Additionally, hospitals and educational institutions are more likely to 
be targets of PILOT programs than museums.
266
  These types of 
organizations have traditionally paid the bulk of PILOT revenue, and will 
most likely be the organizations further impacted as PILOTs expand 
nationwide.
267
  Hospitals represent a much larger portion of section 
501(c)(3) revenues, as 40.2% of nonprofit revenues are from hospitals, and 
only 2.1% are related to the arts, culture or humanities.
268
  Hospitals and 
higher education institutions also own over 40% of nonprofit assets, 
compared to museums, which, along with other cultural and humanities-
oriented nonprofits, own only 3.1% of nonprofit assets.
269
  In cities 
considering implementing or expanding PILOTs, museums are less likely 
to be approached for initial PILOT requests than hospitals and universities 
mainly because museums represent a smaller portion of landowning 
nonprofits.
270
   Only 44% of museums own real estate, compared to 62% of 
 
 264.  PILOT TASK FORCE REPORT, MAYOR’S PILOT TASK FORCE: FINAL REPORT & 
RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (2010), available at http://www.cityofboston.gov/Images_Docu 
ments/PILOT_%20Task%20Force%20Final%20Report_WEB%20_tcm3-21904.pdf. 
 265.  KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 3; see also Pilot Task Force, supra note 233 
(noting that property tax revenue makes up sixty-four percent of Boston’s budget); Daphne 
A. KENYON & ADAM H. LANGLEY, THE PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION FOR NONPROFITS AND 
REVENUE IMPLICATIONS FOR CITIES 4 (2011), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/Upload 
edPDF/412460-Property-Tax-Exemption-Nonprofits.pdf (noting that a study has estimated 
the amount of land cities have wrapped up in property owned by tax-exempt nonprofits and 
has stated that the following cities have the highest percentage of tax-exempt property:  
Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, New York City, Denver, Columbus, Portland, Fort Worth, 
Charlotte, San Francisco, Seattle, Jacksonville, Washington, D.C., San Jose, Houston, 
Dallas, Los Angeles, San Diego, Phoenix, Nashville, Tucson, El Paso, and Memphis). 
 266.  See BRODY ET AL., supra note 252, at 4 (explaining that nonprofit hospitals and 
universities are the most at risk for expanding PILOT programs, and have been the most 
often targeted for PILOTs, largely because of their vast real estate holdings). 
 267.   Id.  Nonprofit hospitals are seen as particularly uncharitable due to their close ties 
to for-profit institutions like insurance companies and pharmacies.  Id. at 4.  They also suffer 
a perceived likeness to for-profit hospitals.  Id. at 4.  
 268.  KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 5. 
 269.  Id. 
 270.  Id. 
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higher education institutions and 70% of hospitals.
271
  Additionally, the 
estimated foregone property tax revenue from the average museum is only 
$133,682, which is low when compared to $1,736,467 for hospitals and 
$1,477,483 for higher education organizations.
272
 
Cities considering PILOTs for museums must acknowledge the 
negative impact increased PILOTs would have on the community.  In order 
to pay city PILOTs, museums would likely have to reduce public services 
and programming, raise admission fees, or decrease local employment, as 
the MFA is now considering.
273
  Cities considering PILOTs would also be 
faced with strong resistance from museums that provide measurable and 
positive economic impacts on the cities.
274
  If a museum can quantify its 
economic benefits and illustrate why it should not have to contribute 
toward municipal services, it may have a better chance at resisting PILOT 
requests. 
Cities are increasing their search for untapped sources of revenue, and 
PILOTs are a way to do so without agitating too many voters.
275
  Although 
museums are unlikely to be approached in a city’s first round of PILOTs, 
they should prepare themselves for related pressure and scrutiny.
276
  If 
Boston successfully raises funds from its reformed PILOT program, many 
more cities are likely to explore PILOTs, and the museums most likely to 
be pushed into negotiations are superstars with land wealth as well as 
commercial activity.
277
  As noted by Professor Brody, cities are asking for 
 
 271.  Id. at 17. 
 272.  Id.  Note that the median museum’s tax savings from property tax exemption is 
$20,181, and that a few wealthy organizations are able to largely impact the average, 
suggesting that perhaps those few museums (the superstars) may be individually targeted for 
PILOTs. 
 273.  See Weinberger, supra note 245. 
 274.  See, e.g., Cooke, supra note 6 (discussing the MFA and Institute of Contemporary 
Art as pushing back slightly and requesting further discussions regarding PILOTs before 
paying the suggested amounts). 
 275. See KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 3 (noting that PILOTs are best for cities 
in which city residents end up supporting nonprofits).  It can be assumed that a straight tax 
increase to cover growing city operating budgets would not be considered favorable to local 
taxpayers.  Cooke, supra note 6, at 13. 
 276.  See KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 7, at 9 (“[C]ity fiscal conditions typically lag 
behind economic conditions by about two years, many municipal officials expect budget 
shortfalls to worsen through 2012.”); see also id. at 7 (noting that PILOTs are related to the 
pressure on nonprofits and the effort of cities to find ways to meet their budgets).  While the 
economy remains unstable, cities are likely to continue to search for new revenue streams, 
which implies that nonprofits are likely to be pressured to prove their deservedness of tax 
exemption.   
 277.  See, Cooke, supra note 6 (citing a local politician as speculating that PILOTs will 
be mimicked by other cities if Boston is successful with the program); see also KENYON & 
LANGLEY, supra note 7 (noting how wealthy land owning museums pull up the average of 
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proof of community benefit in return for tax exemption, and are supporting 
property tax exemption on a quid pro quo rationale.
278
  Thus, museums 
should preemptively prepare for PILOT negotiations by compiling 
measurements of community impact and pushing for clear and specific 
formulas to calculate PILOT fees.
279
  Museums should also highlight the 
benefits they provide such as:  the indirect positive effects on the tourism 
industry, the public nature of museums, the protection and preservation of 
historical and cultural pieces, and most importantly, the provision of 
education and learning.  For museums, cities may be convinced of their 
positive economic and educational impact and consider it unnecessary to 
appropriate funds that would otherwise benefit the community through 
reinvestment in the museum. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Museums are increasing their focus on profit-making activities and 
have begun to operate as commercially savvy institutions.  However, their 
often large untaxed revenue streams and property wealth make superstar 
museums easy targets for changes in tax exemption at the state level and 
requests for PILOTs at the local level.  Federal tax exemption rests on 
strong policy motivations to provide support for the arts as is the norm in 
developed nations.  At the state level, tax exemption is less of a rule, so is 
more easily manipulated by public sentiment and economic stress.  Thus, 
museums should be prepared for challenges to their commercial activities 
and calls for state legislative action on nonprofit tax laws.  The growing 
popularity of PILOTs at the local level also suggests that public perception 
of nonprofits is changing. 
Museums are increasingly criticized for their commercially-oriented 
governances.  To avoid tax policy changes at the local level, and challenges 
to federal and state tax exemption, museums face the burden of shifting 
public perceptions of the benefits they provide to society.  In order to 
weather the storm of criticism regarding profit-seeking activities, museums 
must do more than enlighten the public on culture, art, science, and history.  
Museums must also educate and remind visitors, their communities, and 
the nation at large, of the critical role they serve the general public as 
educators and custodians of our past, present, and future. 
 
tax savings for museums considering the average savings is $133,682 while the median 
savings is $20,181). 
 278.  Brody, supra note 167, at 4. 
 279.  See Anderson, supra note 179 (illustrating ways in which museums can measure 
success and impact). 
